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ABSTRACT 
 
BENEATH THE SURFACE: 
 
AMERICAN CULTURE AND SUBMARINE WARFARE  
 
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
 
by Matthew Robert McGrew 
 
August 2011 
 
Cultural perceptions guided the American use of submarines during the twentieth 
century.  Feared as an evil weapon during the First World War, guarded as a dirty secret 
during the Second World War, and heralded as the weapon of democracy during the Cold 
War, the American submarine story reveals the overwhelming influence of civilian 
culture over martial practices.  The following study examines the roles that powerful 
political and military elites, newspaper editors and Hollywood executives, and ordinary 
citizens – equal players in a game larger than themselves – assumed throughout the 
evolution of submerged warfare from 1914 to 1991.  In each period, cultural discourse 
about the vessels propelled the on-the-ground realities of implementing a practical, yet 
acceptable, approach to an often misunderstood weapon system.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On a bright, clear morning in October 1990, a crowd of political and military 
leaders gathered together in Georgia with members of the press and anxious onlookers to 
catch a glimpse of the United States Navy’s latest Trident-missile submarine.  Christened 
West Virginia a year earlier by Mrs. Erma Byrd, wife of the Democratic senator from the 
ship’s namesake state, the submarine was the picture of patriotic pride.  The vessel sat tall 
in the water, imposing and powerful despite the ornate bunts and streamers of red, white, 
and blue that decorated her decks.  A military band played in the background as well-
dressed gentlemen and ladies mingled with the West Virginia’s officers and crew.  
Underscoring the grandeur of the occasion was the clear presence of high security on land 
and sea marked by armed sentries and high-speed boats with mounted machine guns. 
Amidst the whirlwind of socialite banter and military ceremony stood a young 
family of little or no consequence to the crowd that surrounded them.  Arrayed in their 
middle-class Sunday-Best, the father and mother flanked both sides of their twelve-year-
old son, staring in wonder at the mighty spectacle that unfolded before them.  A chance 
invitation from a well-placed friend had brought them from their home outside a small 
town nestled among the West Virginia hills. 
For the family, it was indeed a special day.  After a private tour of the submarine, 
the proud parents snapped photographs of their son shaking hands with the ship’s master 
– the boy’s gaze directed at the shiny medals that covered the captain’s chest.  Later in 
the day, the wife took care as she selected and purchased three navy-blue sweatshirts that 
bore the ship’s emblem.  With each garment came a small note that read, “Because of 
2 
your generosity, a member of the crew will receive a shirt just like this one.”  The name 
West Virginia had deepened the family’s sense of state and national pride, but this small 
act of kindness provided an intimate connection to the men who manned the submarine.1   
Throughout the twentieth century, American culture dictated the country’s 
policies regarding submarine warfare.  The scene at the West Virginia’s commissioning is 
but a snapshot, isolating one moment in the progression of ever-changing cultural 
perceptions.  Broadly speaking, Americans experienced the realities of submarine warfare 
by filtering events through three dominant perceptions: as victims, as aggressors, and as 
noble defenders.  In the First World War, the country reeled in the wake of German 
Unrestricted Submarine Warfare (USW) that took the lives of innocent bystanders.  From 
the interwar period through the end of the Second World War, Americans accepted 
submarines as part of the country’s navy, but adopted a hear no evil, see no evil, speak no 
evil approach to the vessels – particularly during the country’s own prosecution of USW 
against Japan during the Pacific War.  When the possibility of Soviet nuclear aggression 
threatened the United States during the Cold War, submarines rose to new prominence as 
protectors of freedom that employed weapons of deterrence.  In each period, culture 
defined submarines and their potential uses. 
Although connections between perceptions of submarines in the Cold War and the 
earlier world wars remain unexplored, the discrepancy between First and Second World 
War US Naval policy has not gone unnoticed by military historians.  Author J.E. Talbott 
believes that America’s use of the vessels between 1941 and 1945 represents “one of the 
ironies that has marked the history of modern warfare.”2  Yet, despite the irony, many of 
                                                 
1
 From WHF Papers and Photographs, private collection. 
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the arguments about submarine warfare advanced since 1945 have been simplistic. 
Samuel Eliot Morison’s sweeping, fifteen-volume naval history of the Second World 
War, for example, concluded that the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor had “absolved the 
United States from observing any rule restricting methods of naval warfare…”3  Morison 
gave birth to what this study refers to as the Retaliatory School – the belief that the 
change from submarine victims to aggressive submarine users occurred overnight due 
entirely to Pearl Harbor.  Subsequent studies by Theodore Roscoe (1949), W.J. Holmes 
(1966), and Ernest Andrade (1971) reinforced the Morison thesis of retaliation.4  Even 
Clay Blair’s Silent Victory, heralded as the quintessential work on America’s submarine 
war, subscribes to Morison’s thesis.5  All historians who have followed Morison’s lead 
point to two pieces of evidence they claim proves the retaliation argument: a remark 
made by Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner on 7 December 1941, and testimony offered 
at Nuremberg by Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.  Both men stated matter-of-factly that 
the commencement of USW by the United States came as a response to Pearl Harbor.6  
Over the past thirty years, as the US Navy declassified more official pre-war and 
wartime documents, historians have grappled with the validity of the Retaliatory School’s 
thesis.  One of the earliest published refutations of Morison’s argument, J.E. Talbott’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
2
 J.E. Talbott, “Weapons Development, War Planning and Policy: The US Navy and the 
Submarine, 1917-1941,” Naval War College Review 37, (May/June 1984): 53-71.   
 
3
 Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: Vol. IV, 
Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), 190.  
 
4
 Theodore Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War II (Annapolis: US Naval 
Institute Press, 1949); W.J. Holmse, Undersea Victory: The Influence of Submarine Operations on the War 
in the Pacific (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966); Ernest Andrade, Jr., “Submarine Policy in the United 
States Navy, 1919-1941,” Military Affairs 35, no. 2 (April 1971): 50-6.  
 
5
 Clay Blair, Jr., Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 
1975).  
 
6
 Talbott, “Weapons Development,” 54.  
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1984 article on weapons development and war planning, dismissed the premise of 
retaliation outright.  After considering the connections between US policy, naval strategy, 
and weapons development, Talbott argued that “unrestricted submarine warfare was the 
probable outcome of decisions made as early as 1919 and pursued throughout the 
interwar period.”7  Talbott went on to write that the issuance of orders for USW on 7 
December “seems less a decision than a foregone conclusion.”8  Not so polemic as 
Talbott’s article, Edward Miller’s ground-breaking examination of war planning during 
the interwar period, though adherent in part to the Retaliatory School, did note that talk of 
implementing a USW policy began filtering through official communications prior to the 
Pearl Harbor attack.9   
More recently, naval historians have become less definitive in their arguments 
regarding USW than scholars like Morison and Talbott.  Craig Felker’s 2007 
investigation of the navy’s strategic exercises between 1923 and 1940 reads like the work 
of an author who wants to have his cake and eat it too.10  On one hand, Felker argues that, 
even on the eve of the Second World War, the US Navy continued to ignore the strategic 
importance of submarines.  However, Felker also notes that US submariners had become, 
through simulated fleet engagements, just as aggressive as the main battle wagons, 
making the move to USW after Pearl Harbor “but a small operational leap.”11  Just as 
                                                 
 
7
 Ibid., 56.  
 
8
 Ibid., 67.  
 
9
 Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1991), 320.  
 
10
 Craig C. Felker, Testing American Sea Power: U.S. Navy Strategic Exercises, 1923-1940 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007). 
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ambiguous in its stance regarding the Retaliatory School as Felker’s work is Joel Ira 
Holwitt’s 2009 Execute Against Japan.12  Though Holwitt presents readers with a 
carefully nuanced account of the United States’ move away from the long-standing 
Freedom of the Seas policy toward the 7 December order to conduct USW against Japan, 
his work ultimately has two contradictory themes.  First, Execute Against Japan argues 
that because the United States had no serious intention of using USW, the navy failed to 
develop tactics for submarines that were appropriate to the realities of commerce raiding.  
The failure, contends Holwitt, created cautious submariners who bungled the initial 
months of the USW campaign – an argument which is a mainstay of the Retaliatory 
School’s thesis.  Holwitt’s thorough archival research, however, also unearthed material 
that indicated the navy’s predilection for submarine-based commerce raiding vis-à-vis 
USW ran far deeper than previously believed.  Execute Against Japan demonstrates the 
biggest problem facing historians researching this topic: how to reconcile two 
contradictory theses supported by such substantial archival evidence?  The following 
study argues that the use of culture to examine American submarine warfare reveals a 
larger trend of perception-driven policies that span the entirety of the twentieth century. 
In other areas of historical inquiry, authors facing a multitude of solid, albeit 
exclusive, arguments for causality have found that such opposing forces often share roots 
in the unspoken cultural assumptions of society.  Most notably, Kristin Hoganson’s 
Fighting for American Manhood used culture, specifically assumptions about gender, to 
                                                                                                                                                 
11
 Ibid., 74.  
 
12
 Joel Ira Holwitt, Execute Against Japan: The U.S. Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine 
Warfare (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2009).  
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reexamine the causes of the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars.13  Despite 
the fact that “culture might only complicate our understanding of historical causality, for 
it is never determinative,” Hoganson grounded the known causes of war within the larger 
context of contemporary culture.14  Through this process, the author argued that 
seemingly divergent motives for war stemmed from cultural beliefs and perceptions of 
gender.  Similarly, Noel Perrin’s explanation as to why Japan effectively gave up the gun 
between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries depends largely on an understanding of a 
culture rooted in traditional Samurai swordsmanship.15  The studies of both Hoganson 
and Perrin reveal that an understanding of the broader cultural context that frame military 
decisions can yield fruitful results.  It is with this premise that this study begins.   
Because historians rarely agree on a single transmitter of culture, the phenomenon 
itself, as it appears in this study, deserves attention.  In this matter, the recent work of 
European historians offers some useful conceptualizations.  Carl Schorske’s study of fin-
de- siècle Vienna uses contemporary architecture, music, intellectual theories, and art as a 
lens through which he examines political history.16  Viennese elites, contends the author, 
created cultural representations of their own political perceptions and realities exclusively 
for an audience of their social peers.  Conversely, Vanessa Schwartz broadens this rather 
limited use of culture in her work on Parisian mass culture of the same time period by 
                                                 
 
13
 Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the 
Spanish-American and Philippine American Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
 
14
 Ibid., 2-14.  
 
15
 Noel Perrin, Giving Up the Gun: Japan’s Reversion to the Sword, 1543-1879 (Boston: 
Nonpareil Books, 1979).  
 
 
16
 Carl E. Schorske, Fin-De-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture (New York: Vintage Books, 
1981). 
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finding the mass audience.17  The emergence of what she labels as “spectacular realities” 
(morgue viewings, panoramas, and early cinema) throughout fin-de-siecle Paris gave the 
city’s diverse social classes a common place to mingle and merge into a greater mass 
culture.  Additionally, Schwartz argues that the seemingly separate experiences of both 
the spectacles’ creators and audiences were in fact inextricably connected to one another. 
In both cases, the author’s conceptualization of culture engages the issue of 
agency, yet alone, neither approach fully satisfies the needs presented by a study of 
submarine culture in America.  Therefore, this study employs a synthesis of the two 
approaches, effectively democratizing agency between the masses and individual actors.  
Schorske restricts creative and consumptive agency to the culture of Viennese elites.  If 
applied to this study as is, his approach would discount the role of average Americans in 
creating and shaping cultural discourse.  Similarly, a strict application of Schwartz’s 
methodology, while giving agency to America’s masses, would limit the ability of 
smaller, more powerful groups of individuals to influence discourse at any given time.  
Jeffrey Verhey’s methodological approach in The Spirit of 1914 lends itself well to such a 
synthesis advocated in the following study.18  In examining the creation and manipulation 
of a mythical, unified pro-war atmosphere throughout Germany during the July Crisis of 
1914, Verhey’s argument rests upon evidence found in the editorial stances of 
contemporary newspapers.  The ability of the press to both create and reflect popular 
opinion enables access to both the mass audience and the individual. 
                                                 
 
 
17
 Vanessa R. Schwartz, Spectacular Realities: Early Mass Culture in Fin-De-Siècle Paris 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 
 
 
18
 Jeffrey Verhey, The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization in Germany 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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As the culturally imagined identity of submariners changed during the twentieth 
century, so too did the American discourse of submarine warfare.  In this vein, a 
theoretical model constructed around the fictional Nautilus from Jules Verne’s 20,000 
Leagues Under the Sea provides a means for understanding the cultural discourse about 
submarines in twentieth-century America.  Set in the 1870s, the novel begins with a 
flurry of reports that some unspeakable sea creature has attacked numerous ships making 
trans-Atlantic voyages.  The book’s narrator, Professor Aronnax, is a marine biologist by 
training who agrees to accompany the United States navy on a “monster hunt.”  Aronnax 
falls overboard along with his research assistant and Canadian harpooner Ned Land, 
when the sea beast attacks his ship.  Drifting on the open ocean, the three men find 
themselves beside their quarry, only to discover that the monster is a ship.  Taken aboard 
by the vessel’s crew, Aronnax and the others become the captives of the Nautilus and her 
mysterious master, Captain Nemo. 
The perception of Verne’s Nautilus remains fluid throughout the entire work, 
implying that the ship’s character depends on the shifting qualities expressed by a living 
being, namely her master, Captain Nemo.  Without a captain or crew, Nautilus was an 
inanimate hunk of metallurgy and posed no threat to society.  With the revelation that the 
supposed sea monster is actually a man-made craft, the narrator, Professor Aronnax, 
concludes that the ship’s persons are “[n]o doubt some new sort of pirates, who explored 
the sea in their own way.”19  Exclaiming that “it is an infamous shame” that “not one of 
[the crew] ha[d] the politeness to answer” questions posed by the professor and his 
companions, harpooner Ned Land shouts that the crew most certainly hailed “from the 
                                                 
  
 
19
 Jules Verne, 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1970), 39. 
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land of rogues!”20  Continuing in his description of the ship, the professor makes repeated 
references to the Nautilus as a prison.  Yet after Captain Nemo formally introduces 
himself and offers the prisoners “liberty” to wander about the submarine (though they are 
never to leave), the reader, through the scientific eyes of Aronnax, becomes aware of the 
scientific marvel that is Nautilus: a vessel powered entirely by electricity derived from 
sea water.21 
The creation and alteration of American submarine discourse depended on the 
identity of those persons using the vessels.  In the fictional example, the emotions 
Nautilus evoked merely reflected that aspect of Nemo’s personality that Verne wished to 
describe in a given passage.  Near the book’s end, the mysterious captain becomes a 
figure of compassion and devotion.  After a band of giant squids kills the ship’s 
lieutenant, the professor tells the reader that Nemo “gazed upon the sea that had 
swallowed up one of his companions, and great tears gathered in his eyes.”22  Continuing 
his description of life on board the ship, the professor provides an essential element to the 
“Vernian” model of discourse creation: 
Captain Nemo entered his room, and I saw him no more for 
some time.  But that he was sad and irresolute I could see 
by the vessel, of which he was the soul, and which received 
all his impressions.  The Nautilus did not keep on in its 
settled course; it floated about like a corpse at the will of 
the waves.  It went at random.  [Nemo] could not tear 
himself away from the scene of that last struggle, from this 
sea that had devoured one of his men.23 
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 Ibid., 43.  
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 Ibid., 60-4.  
 
 
22
 Ibid., 271.  
 
 
23
 Ibid., 271-2.  
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From this perspective, the connection between the discourse of submarines and the 
perceived character of the individuals running them becomes inextricably connected. 
Using the cultural identity of submariners as a determinant of discourse creation 
and manipulation requires an acknowledgement that a cultural “audience” plays an 
equally important role in the process.  Similarly to Vanessa Schwartz, Modris Eksteins 
argues that without the reaction of an audience, “spectacles” lose their meaning.24  The 
“Vernian” model illustrates this relationship well.  The civilized, scientific side of Nemo, 
and consequently that of the Nautilus, only presents itself to Professor Aronnax, whose 
own interests and cultural appetites allow room for the ship’s transformation from 
“prison” to “marvel of the modern world.”  In fact, the professor admits that Nemo 
touched Arronax’s “weak point” by offering to share in the scientific findings afforded by 
submarine exploration.25  It is only after this admission that the professor describes, in 
extensive detail, the technological breakthroughs Nemo has achieved.  Ned Land’s 
perception, on the other hand, of the Nautilus as a “prison” only changes at times when 
his personal fate and that of the ship intersect.  Even then, it is arguable that Land only 
suspends, rather than alters, his prior belief.  Clearly, the ever-changing nature of 
discourse depends on the variables associated with both the “viewer” and the “viewed.” 
Though informative and enlightening, analyzing the creation and evolution of 
cultural discourse through the use of the above model only tells one side of the submarine 
story.  A study of an imagined reality that ignores the factual reality implies through 
omission that the two do not relate to one another.  Kathleen Canning’s Languages of 
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 Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989).  
 
 
25
 Verne, 20,000 Leagues, 52. 
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Labor and Gender, much like Jeffrey Verhey’s work, demonstrates that cultural 
discourse and reality interact with and react to each other frequently.26  Simply put, 
discourse derives from a given aspect of reality, the established discourse then informs 
the actions and reactions of society to events, and the process continues indefinitely.  
Based on this principle of interaction, this study will explore the points at which 
American submarine discourse and reality intersect and diverge.  The resulting 
“culturally thick” description of American submarine warfare will place this subject in a 
broader historical context than allowed by more “traditional” military history studies.  To 
that end, the study uses a wide array of primary sources – ranging from print media to 
personal correspondence and journals to official communiqués and policies to popular 
contemporary films – that captured the subtle cultural perceptions of submarines 
throughout the twentieth century.   
Rather than the narrow, policy-based reasons for USW offered by previous 
historians, this study uses the lens of culture to argue that the United States Navy’s road 
to USW in the Second World War was intensely complex and far from certain.  
Furthermore, by extending the scope of research beyond the realm of the two world wars 
and into the Cold War, the following work proposes that the story of American 
submarine warfare came full-circle in the twentieth century.  At the outbreak of the First 
World War, strategists regarded the vessels as suitable only for costal defense.  Public 
disdain for German commerce raiding and international loss of life nearly outlawed 
submarines several times during the interwar period.  Yet after a brief bout of ruthless 
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 Kathleen Canning, Languages of Labor and Gender: Female Factory Work in Germany, 1850-
1914 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002).  
12 
war in the Pacific, the weapons slowly emerged as the harbinger of peace and freedom in 
the Cold War, proving that the best defense was an imposing offense.   
Though arranged thematically according to the three dominant cultural identities 
of submarines during the twentieth century, the chapters in this study follow a generally 
chronological order.  Chapter one takes the reader from the First World War through the 
London Naval Treaty of 1930, highlighting the crests and troughs of cultural discourse 
surrounding the “Despised Weapon of the Hun.”  In an effort to establish the context in 
which American policy makers acted during the interwar years, this section leaves the 
discussion of on-the-ground decision making throughout the 1920s and 1930s to the 
following chapter.  Working within a discourse dominated by Germany’s use of 
submarines forced the interwar US Navy to find a legitimate way to incorporate the 
vessels into an existing Mahanian doctrine of large fleet engagements.  Chapter two 
explores the creation of a military arm that became as “Silent as the Grave” during the 
war of strangulation against Japan.  Additionally, this chapter chronicles the disconnect 
that developed between wartime cultural discourse and reality.  Finally, the third chapter 
reveals how an ever-shifting post-war memory of the weapon’s use between 1941 and 
1945, mixed with Cold War culture and the changed nature of the Nuclear Navy, 
established a discourse that enveloped the “Flagship of Freedom” with patriotic pride as 
demonstrated by the case study of the USS West Virginia. 
The debate between Retaliatory School historians and their intellectual opponents 
has led to an academic dead end.  By limiting their focus to whether or not US officials 
and military leaders had a desire to conduct USW against Japan in a potential Pacific war, 
scholars on both sides have overlooked the larger issue of submarine warfare evolution 
13 
throughout the twentieth century’s entirety.  Essayist John Gierach has mused that 
“making peace with someone tends to bring them into the fold, but before you can make 
peace, you have to have a little war.”27  The American cultural experience with 
submarines from the First World War through the Cold War did just that, for beneath the 
surface of implemented policies churned a turbulent sea of opposing currents born from 
the diverging interests of naval theorists, politicians, and public opinion. 
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 John Gierach, Sex, Death, and Fly-fishing (New York: Simon and Schuster/Fireside, 1990), 180.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
DESPISED WEAPON OF THE HUN 
 
She [a submarine] will never revolutionize modern 
warfare…but for coast defense purposes she is of 
inestimable value.  ~Superintendent of the US Naval 
Academy28 
 
[E]xperience has shown that its scope as a weapon of 
attack…is definitely limited…[and] as far as the experience 
of this war goes[,] the submarine is not destined to 
revolutionize naval warfare…  ~Living Age, 191529 
 
 The widespread use of submarines during the First World War revolutionized the 
cultural conception and physical conduct of warfare in the twentieth century.  It brought 
to light the terrible and destructive force that walked hand-in-hand with modern 
technological and industrial progress.  For contemporaries who experienced, observed, 
and/or read about the psychological and physical terrors birthed by the Great War, 
scientific advancement came at the cost of humanity’s compassion for fellow human 
beings.  The cultural reaction to and discourse about submarines in the United States 
between 1914 and 1930 demonstrates the lasting effects the weapons exerted over 
modern warfare and society despite an early belief to the contrary.  The poetic loss of 
innocence attributed to the Great War extended beyond the imagined realm of humanity’s 
soul and into the world of naval warfare.  The myth, and later the memory, that the 
submarine destroyed the notion of honorable naval warfare took hold between 1914 and 
1918, gaining momentum during the Versailles Peace Conference.  While the ambivalent 
face of technological progress did receive some blame for the new dishonorable warfare, 
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most responsibility fell squarely on the shoulders of Germany.  Media reports confirmed 
and reinforced this sentence during and after the war, giving rise to what this study 
identifies as the first culturally dominant identity of the submarine in twentieth-century 
America: Despised Weapon of the Hun. 
It did not take long after the German declaration of unrestricted submarine 
warfare (USW) on February 4, 1915 for America to protest the targeting of civilians 
aboard ships.  While the legacy of the RMS Lusitania sinking in May of 1915 endures in 
today’s society, the spark that first set the American tinderbox aflame came over a month 
before.  On April 10, a German U-boat torpedoed and sank the RMS Falaba, killing over 
one hundred civilians, including one American.  A survey of national newspaper reports 
following the incident reveals the voracity with which the country’s citizenry reacted to 
the sinking: “a crime against humanity;” “a frenzied beast at bay;” “not war, but murder;” 
“brutal;” “cold-blooded;” “cowardly;” “atrocious;” “assassination;” “it tends to make the 
stories of other German atrocities credible;” “shocking bloodthirstiness;” “a massacre;” 
“uncivilized;” “piracy;” “barbarism;” “a humiliation to all the world;” “wickedness such 
as the history of war will find it difficult to match.”30  Literary Digest went on to report 
that the justification offered by the German navy – that the death of a relative handful of 
non-combatants paled in comparison to the millions of people starving at the hands of the 
British naval blockade –fell on the ears of a deaf American public.31    
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 The same issue of Literary Digest included several articles, cartoons, and 
photographs that painted Germans in a negative light, maintaining the persona so richly 
described in the publication’s lead story.  The German starvation tales met with 
skepticism and a cartoon poking-fun at a rail-thin “German Michel” who exclaimed, 
referencing the supposed 200-gram bread ration, “Well, I shall have to pull in my belt 
another hole.”32  This farcified image juxtaposed a story on the opposing page that told of 
the British disgust with reports of “pampered” German POWs following rumors that 
English POWs, held by Germany, were the objects of hardships and atrocities.  A cartoon 
from London’s St. James Gazette accompanied the story, synthesizing its two main 
points.  In the depiction, two captured German officers sat in lounge chairs, with feet 
propped up, while English valets lit pipes and cigars and served beer steins from silver 
platters.  An angry John Bull stood in the background with clenched fist as he muttered, 
“I don’t want to treat them as they do our prisoners in Germany – but this is going a bit 
too far.”33  Though this and other images discussed later in the study did originate from 
outside the United States, the fact to remember is that the American pressed syndicated 
foreign reports, pictures, and cartoons, bombarding the public with war rhetoric.   
Yet another article from the same issue of Literary Digest continued the anti-
German motif, though more subtly on this occasion.  The discussion of “German War-
Professors,” meaning members of Germany’s pre-war academic community who served 
in the army, appeared innocent enough on the surface.  After all, the reputation of the 
belligerent country’s intellectual elite, particularly at this time, carried with it a certain 
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cultural sophistication.  Highlighting the reopening of the Brussels Museum under 
German occupation seemed a logical way to present the civilized side of the Hun.  The 
covert jabs at the German character, however, came briefly in the captions that 
accompanied photographs of the museum’s new curators: 
“German Soldiers Amid Belgian Art.” 
The Brussels Museum was reopened on February 7, the 
first time since the war began.  Two thousand Germans, 
soldiers and civilians, visited the place.  Those before us 
are inspecting the work of Belgian sculptor, Meunier.  
Some Belgians came to see if their treasures were still 
safe.34 
 
Taken by itself, this last jab seems like a hollow cultural quip.  Yet, when placed in the 
context of the issue’s other fierier language, the line assumes a variety a meanings:  at 
best, Germans became petty thieves; at worst, they embodied absolute evil.  According to 
the “Vernian” model, submarine warfare itself, at this time, became evil because it 
reflected the dark character of its master – Germany. 
 Oddly enough, the event that popular memory erroniously associates with 
America’s entry into the First World War received a milder treatment – at least in terms 
of adjective use – in the nation’s press.  The front page news of the Lusitania sinking 
brought with it calls for action.  Former U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt reached out 
to his former constituents, arguing that America owed quick and decisive action, “not 
only to humanity[,] but to our own national self-respect.”35  An accompanying Chicago 
Tribune cartoon showed Uncle Sam, Norway, and Sweden violently flailing in a boat 
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named Neutrality as a German torpedo struck the hull.36  The Springfield, Massachusetts 
Republican warned that the successful sinking of Lusitania might encourage Germany to 
bolster its campaign of USW, “utterly regardless of the murderous deterioration in the 
moral character of the warfare which submarine attacks on passenger-ships involve.”  
The Republican concluded that the “inhumanity” of the submarine made it an 
“assassin.”37 
 Addressing the seemingly contradictory nature of contemporary media reports 
surrounding Falaba and Lusitania and popular memory requires a multi-faceted 
explanation.  Because the two disasters occurred within the span of approximately one 
month, newspaper editors undoubtedly needed a fresh way to spin the latest German 
atrocity.38  The progression of human emotion suggests that the first sinking jolted the 
American public, requiring them to find the appropriate language with which they could 
engage the issue publicly.  With a mastery of this new language, America met the second 
sinking with a firm resolve to act.39  Furthermore, the need for “action today” came, most 
assuredly, from the rise in non-combatant fatalities, particularly in terms of American 
lives lost.  The torpedoing of Lusitania killed nearly 1.200 people, including 128 
Americans.  Compared to the Falaba incident, wherein only one U.S. citizen died, 
Lusitania struck a nerve in the American public, the pain of which did not dissipate in the 
months that followed. 
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 As Germany’s policy of USW continued throughout the summer of 1915, 
American anti-submarine rhetoric deepened, placing more pressure on President Wilson 
to act.  The front-page story of Literary Digest from July 31, 1915 featured a “History of 
the First Year of the War,” and discussed German double-talk of bowing to Wilson’s 
demands for the cessation of USW.  Depictions of Uncle Sam reflected the perception 
that Germany had abused America’s good faith.  In one cartoon, the bloodied hand of the 
country’s patriarch reached out to Germany’s clenched fist, the caption noting that “…he 
still offers to shake hands.”  Similarly, a drawing appeared of Sam examining his hole-
ridden hat and remarking that, “They may have been unfortunate accidents, but the 
marksmanship is deadly.”40  In both cases, the wounds and tears alike bore the names of 
sunken liners like Lusitania, Gulflight, Frye, and Cushing.     
 In September 1915, Americans reveled in what they believed marked a diplomatic 
win for the neutral countries of the world.  The news of German Ambassador Johann von 
Bernstorff’s assurance to the Wilson administration that submarines would no longer fire 
on merchant ships without warning brought a sigh of relief to the nation’s public; 
newspaper headlines proclaimed “Germany Yields to Wilson” and “Submarine Warfare a 
Failure.”41  In October, Living Age published a British article entitled, “The Future of the 
Submarine.”42  The anonymous author described the impracticality of sustained USW, 
arguing that “…because of the inferiority of the submarine [to surface vessels]…the 
present German submarine campaign has been checked.”43  While the article offered no 
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evidence for such inferiority, reason suggests that British hubris as the world’s mightiest 
sea power informed the author’s conclusion.  Similar articles praised White House 
efforts, while simultaneously assuring the public that even without such diplomatic 
intervention, USW could not endure.  The time when the submarine menace ruled 
supreme, it appeared, had come to peaceful conclusion. 
 And yet, the official end of USW on September 1 did not disperse the air of 
apprehension that continued to hang over the United States.  Ever the hard-liner, 
Theodore Roosevelt continued to speak out against Germany, insisting that merely 
“stop[ping] the policy of assassination” merited no gratitude on America’s part.44  
Germany’s true motivations for halting USW became a point of debate in the media, 
bolstered by reports in the British and French presses that the Hun had lulled America 
into a false sense of security.  Literary Digest published a German photo entitled, “Tirpitz 
in a Tender Moment,” that showed the Grand Admiral holding a young child.  Though 
the caption scoffed at the admiral’s reputation as a “baby killer” who loved “piracy and 
murder,” it still noted that he had a zeal for “vigorous submarine warfare” that German 
Chancellor von Bethman Hollweg managed to curb in the wake of American protests.45   
The implication that Tirpitz and his fleet of U-boats waited for the right time to renew the 
devouring of civilian liners pervaded contemporary newspapers.  A cartoon in London’s 
Westminster Gazette typified this belief, chronicling a brief conversation between the 
Kaiser and von Tirpitz: 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
43
 Ibid., 242.  
  
 
44
 “German Yields to Wilson,” Literary Digest, September 11, 1915, 509. 
 
 
45
 Ibid., 830. 
21 
von Tirpitz – “Boo-hoo! They won’t let me be frightful any 
more!” 
The Kaiser – “Nevermind, Tirpy!  You can make a 
‘mistake’ now and again, and Bernstorff can apologize.”46 
 
The “Summer of the Submarine” had done its damage.  American faith that Germany 
would keep its promise to conduct proper submarine warfare ran thin.  And so, the 
country anxiously waited as the war continued. 
 The sudden arrival of U-53 in Newport Harbor on October 7, 1916, renewed 
American fear of the submarine menace.  After a brief three-hour stay, the submarine left 
the harbor, cleared neutral waters, and began what Living Age called a “career of 
destruction.”47  Because the German commander provided ample warning and time for 
evacuation of the ships, none of the eight sinkings resulted in loss of life.  Nevertheless, 
the press refused to credit the actions of the commander, explaining that the lack of 
fatalities resulted from the “promptness and able seamanship shown by the American 
naval force.”48  A correspondent with the New York Evening Post stated that submarine 
operations, so close to American shores, exerted the most visible strain on diplomatic 
relations between Washington and Berlin.  He added that “it is largely a question of luck” 
and a matter of time before Germany, willingly or accidentally, violates the conditions 
agreed upon with the United States.49 
 During the U-53 affair, Literary Digest published four cartoons from Nashville, 
New York, and Brooklyn newspapers that epitomized the generally perceived 
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characterizations of German submarine warfare.50  Cartoonists often drew submarines as 
some type of canine.  The dogs, by and large, fell into two categories: a loyal dachshund, 
calling on the “sour kraut and wieners” motif, or a ravenous wolf, foaming at the mouth 
and straining at its leash.  Both types of illustrations included a German master, either 
training the dachshund to do a new trick or holding the leash of monstrous beast.  The 
cartoon from Nashville offered a different perspective that still captured the essence of 
the canine approach: a recovering alcoholic, dressed as a German, frantically paced 
outside a bar labeled “Resumption of Submarine Warfare” with a caption that asked the 
question, “Backsliding?”  All of these illustrations reinforced and bolstered the cultural 
link between the character of Germans and the nature of submarine warfare.   
 Throughout this period, policy makers in the nation’s capital noted the fluidity of 
public opinion and discourse about German submarines.  In his postwar memoirs, 
Secretary of State Robert Lansing wrote that the Lusitania sinking “sent a wave of horror 
throughout the country, particularly in the East.”51  Regional proximity to the U-boat 
threat certainly affected the degree of public fear, for “as one went westward…the 
demands for drastic action grew less emphatic.”52  Due to the lack of public unanimity, 
Lansing and other officials in Washington deemed it necessary to avoid the issue of war 
until Germany forced the divided citizenry to unite through a “slow and irritating period 
of education and enlightenment,” vis-à-vis USW.53  As discussed above, Germany’s 
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pledge to halt USW in late 1915 did not ease the fear of submarines throughout the 
country, and in a January 1916 memorandum to President Wilson, Lansing 
acknowledged the continued possibility of war.  While the Secretary of State believed 
Germany’s aggression would inevitably threaten American sovereignty, he again stated 
that “public opinion is not yet ready to accept this point of view.  The American people 
will have to be educated to a true vision of the menace that Germany is to liberty and 
democracy.”54  Though Lansing’s memoirs never revealed the means by which such an 
education would occur, every newspaper account of U-boat attacks undoubtedly 
strengthened the “true vision” of Germany.  By early 1917, the secretary seemed to 
believe that America’s “education” neared completion when he concluded another 
memorandum to President Wilson: “War cannot come too soon to suit me since I know 
that it must come at last.”55 
Meanwhile, the failure of the submarine to break the British blockade’s 
stranglehold of German shipping, particularly after the surface fleet engagement at the 
Battle of Jutland in mid-1916, forced the Imperial Navy’s leaders to conclude that 
winning the war rested on the resumption of USW.  At the risk of war with America, 
USW could, reasoned the Kaiser’s advisors, force the British out of the war before 
America entered the fighting.  With this gambling logic, Germany announced the renewal 
of USM on February 1, 1917, and began sinking enemy shipping at an alarming rate – U-
boats sank 386,000 tons of shipping in January, escalating to 881,000 tons by April.56  
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German necessity and American public opinion raced toward one another like two 
juggernauts on a collision course. 
 Germany’s submarine salvation immediately became a “Catch 22” when neutral 
America declared, “Enough,” on April 4, 1917.  Following the February announcement, 
the United States severed diplomatic ties with Germany.  Though President Wilson still 
offered hope that war between the two countries would not come, he clearly stated that 
submarines would decide American action:  
If this inveterate confidence on my part in the sobriety and 
prudent foresight of [German] purpose should unhappily 
prove unfounded, if American ships and American Lives 
[sic] should, in fact, be sacrificed by [German] naval 
commanders in heedless contravention of the just and 
reasonable understandings of international law and the 
obvious dictates of humanity, I shall take the liberty of 
coming again before the Congress to ask that authority be 
given me to use any means necessary for the protection of 
our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their 
peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas.57 
 
Two days later, Wilson made good on his promise and asked that Congress, in response 
to the continuance of USW, declare war against Germany.  Following the congressional 
declaration, Wilson addressed the American people, calling for unified resolve and effort 
to end the war quickly, “submarines or no submarines.”58  While the utterances of Wilson 
did not create or significantly modify America’s cultural discourse of submarine warfare, 
they most assuredly placed that discourse at the forefront of the country’s wartime 
memory and shaped the cultural response to the vessels in the decades following the First 
World War. 
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 After America officially entered the war, the nation’s press began to downplay the 
threat of German submarines.  Wartime propaganda and fewer sinkings – American 
Admiral William Sims helped implement a convoy system that escorted 88, 000 ships 
through U-boat-infested waters, losing only 436 – undoubtedly played a large role in this 
changed discourse, but nonetheless, the relaxed tone of reports from late 1917 and 1918 
added a new dimension to existing cultural perceptions.59  In August of 1918, Literary 
Digest published a story, mockingly entitled, “The ‘U’-Boats’ Effort to Terrify Us,” in 
which a New York Tribune correspondent chronicled submarine actions off the coast of 
Cape Cod.  While a crowd of observers gathered on sand dunes, an anonymous U-boat 
“battled” four fishing scows.  The Tribune reporter gave his personal opinion of what the 
maneuvers resembled: 
A child with a “mad” on is the nearest thing to this U-
Boat’s tactics; say, a child locked up in a room for 
punishment who vents his wrath on the only enemy 
available by upsetting the chairs and pulling the covers off 
the crib.60 
  
In closing, the reporter assured his readers that, scows aside, “the submarine in the 
Atlantic has been an utter failure…”61  This humorous account illustrates the radical shift 
from the abrasive rhetoric used to describe the Falaba sinking to one of the final 
conceptions of submarine warfare in 1918, making American wartime discourse anything 
but static. 
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 At various times throughout the war, members of Congress sought to uncover the 
reasons for conflicting reports that the submarine threat had subsided.  In late January 
1918, the House Committee on Naval Affairs pressed Secretary of the Navy Josephus 
Daniels to evaluate the progress made by the Allies in checking German submarine 
attacks.  While Daniels did believe that the Allies would win the naval war, his response 
provided clear reasons for the shifting public perception of submarines. 
The loss by the submarines is like a pendulum.  At one time 
the loss was so great, some months ago, that people were 
panic stricken.  Then it fell down so low that everybody 
became perfectly satisfied the menace was ended; that is, 
the average man thought so.  Then it went up again…It will 
not do to say that we have overcome it; it will not do to say 
that the menace does not still exist…62 
 
In addition to newspaper accounts that illustrated the “submarine pendulum,” members of 
the committee noted that differing reports concerning the existence of a submarine threat 
helped fuel public confusion whenever congressmen returned from fact-finding missions 
in England.  Because of the dynamic nature of submarine war, Secretary Daniels offered 
that no “Congressman has been given the correct figures, or anyone else.”63  Submarine 
warfare, therefore, presented the perfect breeding ground for cultural discourse largely 
disconnected from reality.  Despite this disconnect, the submarine discourse forged 
between 1914 and 1918 carried over into the peace-time world and began to affect on-
the-ground reality as diplomats from across the globe converged on Paris to erect an 
“eternal peace.” 
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 Immediately after the November 1918 armistice, reports began to pour out of 
Germany that painted the country’s population in a sympathetic light.  Germans called for 
leniency at the Paris Peace Conference in wake of the continued British naval blockade 
that starved the country into submission, but during this time, the American press 
invoked the memory of the evil Hun vessels.  The Wall Street Journal reacted to such 
pleas by declaring that “every German family should be furnished with an appetizing list 
of food-cargoes sent to the bottom by U-Boats.”64  Stephane Lauzanne, editor of the Paris 
Matin, warned the American public to be wary of German “sob stuff,” noting that “it is 
ridiculous to speak of the ‘good German people’ – the same German people who shouted 
with glee when the Lusitania was sunk and little American children drowned.”65  
Lauzanne concluded his warning by insisting that the only good Germans were those who 
were dead.66 
 Not even reports that the German navy mutinied in the war’s final months found 
sympathy among most Americans.  The Philadelphia Public Ledger observed that, “The 
German seamen never mutinied against orders to kill women and children.”67  The 
Greenville, South Carolina Piedmont colored all German sailors as dishonorable, 
observing that while “the Hun battleships had a disgraceful ending [at Scapa Flow]…the 
submarines had a disgraceful beginning.”68  The revival of fiery wartime rhetoric brought 
with it a call for justice as President Wilson prepared to meet with fellow diplomats in 
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Paris.  Newspapers explicitly tied former Kaiser Wilhelm II and perpetrators of USW 
together as nothing more than common criminals.  The Baltimore Sun insisted that 
“whatever is done with William [sic], there are other supercriminals who must not escape 
if justice is to be done: the instigators and perpetrators of U-Boat infamies…It would be 
unpardonable if any of these should be allowed to escape swift and terrible 
punishment.”69  With such a sweeping mandate for reciprocity, the delegates in Paris 
began to draft terms of peace that cited USW as justification for burdening Germany with 
the payment of massive war reparations. 
 Following the completion of the Treaty of Versailles, Americans rejoiced in what 
the publishers of Women’s Weekly called Freedom’s Triumph.70  In the volume, 
Freedom’s Triumph, the authors wrote about the inhumane nature of German warfare.  
Submarines featured prominently alongside pictures of poison gas attacks and 
flamethrowers as “diabolical method[s] of warfare originated by the Germans.”71  An 
article entitled, “The Honor of the Seas,” addressed the “ruthless” use of USW, again 
calling on the memory of the Lusitania.72  According to the article, “Never, until the 
present war, did a nation that pretended to being [sic] civilized, allow women and 
children to become the prey of warcraft.”73  Similarly, a later article about the scuttling of 
the German fleet at Scapa Flow left no doubt as to the nature of “the Hun code of 
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honor.”74  The author of the article called the scuttling incident an “act of wanton 
destruction and criminal wastefulness” that attempted to avoid the consequences of 
“[Germany’s] foolishness and final defeat.”75  So strong was the desire to condemn 
German actions that the article’s author suggested the killing of unarmed German sailors 
by the British navy “in wild and righteous indignation.”76  Clearly, the cultural 
conception of the Despised weapon of the Hun reached its zenith during and immediately 
after the Paris Peace Conference. 
 With Germany put in its proper place, most Americans turned their attention to 
domestic issues even as the country’s leaders convened the world’s largest disarmament 
conference in late 1921.  When national interest did focus on the Washington 
Conference, however, public opinion revealed a lack of the unanimity that had helped 
guide the diplomats in Paris two years earlier.  In newspapers across the country, editors 
railed that the conference was either too great or too limited in its scope: an excessive 
disarmament agreement would weaken the nation’s ability to defend itself, but too light 
of an agreement would fail to check the potential aggression of foreign powers.  William 
Randolph Hearst’s New York-based American called the conference an attack against 
U.S. sovereignty, while the Springfield, Massachusetts Republican noted that, for the 
event’s organizers, “it has not been deemed practicable to include aircraft in the scaling-
down process.”77  Similarly, the New York Times asked its readers, “Of what avail would 
it be to reduce and regulate dreadnought construction if nothing were done to set a limit 
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to the expansion of new instruments of war?”78  Many editors, such as those at the 
Canadian Kingston Whig and the Colorado Springs Gazette, channeled their fiscally-
minded audience when reporting on the conference proceedings.  The Whig suggested 
that “an excellent figurehead for battleships would be a formal design of a weeping 
taxpayer,” and the Gazette asserted that, “if placed end to end, the national debts would 
conclude that war is unprofitable.”79  Other papers, including the Lincoln Star, viewed 
the financial benefit of scrapping naval construction with skepticism: “You see, by 
reducing navies we can save money enough to build far-cruising and heavily-armored 
aircraft.”80 
 Public faith in the hope promised by the Washington Conference waned as the 
world leaders assembled appeared as divided as the host nation.  British representative 
Arthur Balfour called the proposed limitation on submarine tonnage too liberal given the 
events of the world war.81  As a nation of limited naval strength, France opposed Great 
Britain’s attempts to severely limit – or abolish outright – the use of submarines.  The 
New York Times ran the response of Stephane Lauzanne to Balfour in which the French 
newspaper editor called submarines the “arm of the poor,” noting that, “in these times of 
expensive living, it is the only arm which is still cheap.”82  While the Lansing Capital 
News jokingly remarked that “nations could safely lose their arms if statesmen wouldn’t 
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lose their heads,”83 the New York Call feared that the conference would bring “the same 
disillusionment that followed the ‘war to end war.’”84  Reporting on the diplomatic 
squabbling, the Norfolk Virginia Pilot surmised that “while agreement at the Washington 
Conference is not to be expected before snow flies, it is to be hoped for before fur 
flies.”85   
 As diplomats argued over the size of future navies, the American public continued 
to debate the issue of submarine warfare.  Many papers constantly voiced concerns that 
the conference would leave several stones unturned when it came to regulating new 
weapons of war, particularly the submarine.  The St. Louis Star proclaimed that 
“America’s influence at the conference should be thrown against the weapons that are 
directed at non-combatants – the submarine and poison gas.”86  Other Americans 
believed that the aim of the conference should mirror that of 1919 Paris and make future 
wars impossible.  As noted by Literary Digest, dozens of papers, including the Louisville 
Courier-Journal, the Des Moines Register, and the Baltimore Sun, agreed that “it is 
useless to forbid inventions; the only way to prevent the use of aerial bombs, submarines, 
and poison gas in war is to prevent war.”87  From a more pragmatic perspective the New 
York Globe reminded its readers that “war is slaughter, and can never be anything else, 
and victory will always go to the contestant who is best at killing.”88  In the end, the 
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conference proved to some observers that “the pen is mightier than the battleship,”89 but 
not the submarine.  Battleships commanders had committed no crimes, whereas 
submarines had, and yet the conference treated the two as deserving of equal 
consideration.  The Washington Treaty merely dictated that the signatories limit the 
number of submarines in their respective navies and use the vessels honorably during 
times of war – an easy promise to make in peacetime.  As the Steubenville, Ohio Herald-
Star observed, “Germany is privileged to snicker a bit when she hears that battleships are 
wicked while subs are essential.”90  The grand disarmament conference had done nothing 
to eliminate the weapons that struck fear into heart of America between 1914 and 1918.   
 While the Washington Conference failed to definitively settle the “submarine 
question” despite strong postwar anti-German sentiment, the 1920s saw a shift in cultural 
discourse that further hindered subsequent attempts to control the Hun weapon.  In 1927, 
famed writer Lowell Thomas published Count Luckner, The Sea Devil, a volume that 
went far in dismantling America’s negative perception of Germans.91  Thomas’ book – in 
actuality, the count’s autobiography – told the story of a first-class sailor whose 
intentions were honorable and whose actions were admirable.  As the captain of a 
commerce raider during the Great War, Luckner snuck past the British blockade and 
commenced a campaign of principled destruction.  The count “had the unique and 
enviable reputation of disrupting Allied shipping without ever having taken a human life 
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or so much as drowning a ship’s cat.”92  Likening Luckner to the famed “Lawrence of 
Arabia,” Thomas asserted that the captain and his crew were “romantic people traveling 
in the most romantic way known to the sea” – in a wooden sail ship.93  Although many 
years of serving before the mast had rendered him “unable to express himself without 
using sulphury profanities,” daring tenacity and strong self-discipline allowed Luckner to 
replace the “blazing nautical oaths” with the English expression, “By Joe!”94  
Undoubtedly, Thomas’s faithful readers – of whom he had many – read such turns of 
phrase and thought, “If there is one such man in Germany, perhaps there are more.” 
 The cultural importance of Luckner’s story becomes clearer when placed in the 
context of 1920s international politics, particularly in terms of German war guilt.  In late 
1918, the German government appointed Legation Secretary Bernhard W. von Bülow to 
head a special bureau of inquiry with the expressed purpose of proving the country’s 
innocence to the delegates at Versailles.95  The hurried efforts of the bureau created the 
“professors’ memorandum” of May 27, 1919.  Signed by four members of the Heidelberg 
Association for a Policy of Justice,96 the document concluded that Germany had 
conducted a “defensive war against tsarism” in 1914.97  After the failure to temper Allied 
resolve, Bülow’s bureau became the War Guilt Section of the Foreign Ministry, charged 
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with the long-term historical revision of the war’s causes.  After hiring three respected 
academics to serve as editors, the War Guilt Section published forty volumes of 
government records between 1922 and 1927 from the Foreign Ministry office that 
“proved” German innocence in aggressively waging war during 1914.98  Despite the 
academic veneer, Bülow retained sole discretionary power in determining which 
documents to include in Die Grosse Politik, ultimately creating a type of “scholarly” 
propaganda.99  Nonetheless, Bülow’s project helped pave the way for other revisionists 
scholars of the 1920s. 
 While Bülow’s War Guilt Section labored, post-war Germany rapidly declined in 
the midst of political, social, and economic turmoil.  The new Weimar government 
proved unable to deal with rebellious factions of the political left and right.  Because the 
Treaty of Versailles limited the size of the nation’s army, particularly the officer corps, 
Germans lost an important pillar of their national identity rooted in long-standing 
Prussian militarism.100  Most devastating of all, the wartime food shortage mixed with 
economic disaster in the form of hyper-inflation, crippling the defeated nation.  
Germany’s supposed innocence, coupled with the country’s internal deterioration, caused 
people throughout the Western world, including America, to conclude that the treaty was 
far too punitive.  As a result, international sympathy for Germany grew throughout the 
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decade, creating room for revisionist interpretations of the war’s causes and 
consequences. 
 Inspired by the evidence presented in Die Grosse Politik  and bent on removing 
the stigma of war guilt from their country, nationalistic authors of German reactionary 
literature during the 1920s questioned the role of France in the years leading up to 
1914.101  In theory, proving German innocence and French guilt in terms of causing the 
First World War would remove Germany’s post-war obligations to France, particularly 
the payment of massive reparations.102  During this time, the belief in the French desire 
for revanche helped frame much of the scholarship.  According to this approach, the 1871 
loss of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany following the Franco-Prussian War compelled 
French leaders during the next forty years to construct their country’s foreign policy 
around the idea of revanche.  The theory became reality when the Treaty of Versailles 
stripped Germany of the two territories and restored them to France.  Historians bolstered 
their argument with the fact that France’s president in 1914, Raymond Poincaré, grew up 
in Lorraine and experienced the German take-over of the region as a young boy.  British 
and American revisionism, inspired by Versailles diplomat John Maynard Keynes, grew 
in popularity throughout the decade.103  Historians such as Harry Elmer Barnes and 
Robert L. Owen argued that a Franco-Russian alliance, seeking the territorial acquisitions 
of Alsace-Lorraine and the Dardanelles, conspired to engineer a Balkan conflict.104  Even 
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in France, leftist historians charged their country and Poincaré with warmongering until 
the 1929 publication of the country’s diplomatic documents.105  Taken as a whole, 
Thomas’s Sea Devil and the easing of anti-German tensions throughout America dealt a 
crippling blow to the dominant cultural perception that submarines were evil.106 
 When world leaders met at the 1930 London Naval Conference to discuss the 
issue of abolishing submarines, the absence of a strong German navy exposed the 
opposing world views associated with the vessels.  The representatives from the United 
States and Great Britain urged their fellow diplomats to consider the total abolition of 
submarines “in the belief that [they] cannot be controlled during wartime.”107  In contrast, 
France and Japan – both of whom had smaller, weaker navies – insisted that the weapons 
were essential for coastal defense.  At the conclusion of the conference the Philadelphia 
Record recorded the diplomatic stalemate as follows: “After being solemnly brought to 
trial on charges of murder, the submarine has been released on parole and under 
obligations of good behavior.”108  As with the Washington Conference, London’s attempt 
to rid the world of submarines ended the same as it began – with hope that civilized 
nations would fight civilly.  Viewing the London treaty as nothing more than a farce, the 
Washington Post accused the country’s delegation of “utterly misrepresenting American 
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Policy” in advocating the abolition of submarines.  In fact, the Post noted, “the security 
of the Panama Canal depends largely upon the skilful use of defensive [italics mine] 
submarines.”109 
 The Post’s observation of U.S. submarine policy proved more accurate than 
perhaps the correspondent realized.  Since 1897, the United States had planned for a 
potential war with Japan, the strategy for which composed “War Plan Orange.”  As 
technologies evolved, naval strategists had to account for the use of new weapons such as 
submarines.  In the aftermath of the First World War, U.S. policy makers had to walk a 
fine line when it came to using the vessels as commerce raiders.  As noted by Edward 
Miller, the submarine dilemma was two fold in the 1930s: (a) Despite an ease in 
international tensions, the American public still attributed German USW with the 
country’s entrance into the war following the “indiscriminate sinkings” of unarmed 
merchant vessels, and (b) owing to the physical impracticality of searching possible 
belligerent ships, “submarines could not honor the gentlemanly code of the Hague 
Convention” and other such treaties.110  Despite the protests of submariners, plan 
“Orange” continued to adhere to international treaties that tied the hands of the Navy. 
 With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the cultural perception of the 
submarine as the Despised Weapon of the Hun officially met its end, having been in a 
veritable iron lung since 1930.  Because the aerial bombardment of the naval base had 
neglected to destroy the submarine fleet, submarines immediately became the first line of 
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attack.111  However, due to the lack of initiative shown by the prudent submarine 
commanders, the United States strategy of USW failed for several months into 1942.  It 
was only when skippers began exhibiting uninhibited zeal that the vessels started gaining 
ground against the Japanese navy and merchant fleet.  As such, the “changing of the 
guard” that occurred onboard submarines marked the cultural death of the Despised 
Weapon of the Hun.  In its place came another cultural identity that had lain in wait since 
the 1920s – one that was as Silent as the Grave.  It is to that strain of discourse and reality 
that this study’s second chapter will attend. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
SILENT AS THE GRAVE 
 
The formal graduation exercise which used to be held 
before the war started has been replaced by an informal 
gathering such as this morning’s assembly.  This lack of 
fanfare is consistent with the submarine way of life.  
However[,] this lack of ceremony does not lessen the 
importance of your stepping into a new field of usefulness 
to the submarine service…I caution you not to be 
optimistic or to take away an idea the submarine work out 
on patrol is ‘Peaches and Cream.’  It is the submarine’s job 
to carry on a campaign of steady attrition.  ~Remarks to 
Submarine Officer Class #74, December 1943112 
 
 The graduation speech from 1943 reveals the uncertainty that plagued American 
submariners for decades.  First and foremost, the speaker in question correctly described 
the nature of contemporary discourse surrounding American submarine warfare.  The 
branch of the United States Navy known as the “Silent Service” was one enshrouded in a 
mystery that posed more questions than it answered.  The American public’s quiet 
acquiescence that submarines were, in fact, a permanent fixture of the country’s military 
was a relatively minor footnote in the submarine’s story.  Throughout the interwar period, 
the submarine debate continuously returned to the same nagging point of inquiry: what 
role will these vessels have in a modern navy?  The graduation speaker indicates that, at 
least by 1943, the necessities of war had answered that question and forced submariners 
to become arbiters of attrition.  Yet, the reference to the perception of submarine work as 
“Peaches and Cream” also reveals an awareness that not all wartime patrols concentrated 
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on commerce raiding or engagements with enemy warships.  Indeed, war patrols largely 
consisted of monotonous routine, interspersed with occasional excitement.  Historian 
Stephanie Cousineau has called the American submarine war against Japan “a search for 
identity” because submariners “wore many hats, as fleet supporters, mine-layers, life-
guarders, warship killers and, not least, as wagers of unrestricted submarine warfare.”113 
 Despite Cousineau’s accurate assertion that US submarines lacked a clear 
identity, she, like other naval historians, has failed to explore fully the roots of wartime 
events and public perception.  By focusing solely on the military perspective, she and 
other historians have presented readers with an incomplete picture.  Most treatments of 
interwar naval policy regarding submarines have correctly noted that popular memory of 
German “atrocities” during the First World War played a role in deciding strategy for 
future wars, yet generally gloss over the nature of that memory with a single, generic 
sentence. 
The lack of a unified cultural perception regarding the use of American 
submarines created an environment that fostered the growth of competing submarine 
strategies.  Craig Felker has noted that during the interwar period “naval officers 
struggled to shape a technological anomaly to exist within a tightly bounded [Mahanian] 
strategic framework.”114  The discourse about the “Despised Weapon of the Hun” 
similarly forced strategists to work within a cultural framework wary of offensive 
submarine operations, at least with regard to commerce raiding.  As sneaky conceptions 
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of the vessels weakened, the aggressive plans for US submarines gained momentum.  
However, the submarine’s lack of cultural identity hampered the creation of a definitive 
strategic purpose that spilled over into the practical execution of the Pacific War, 
especially during the early months of 1942.  The wanting for a culturally accepted guerre 
de course likewise gave birth to the perception that submarines were, by nature, highly 
secretive.  During the Second World War, Hollywood co-opted and bolstered the notion 
of the “Silent Service,” lending credence to a limited submarine discourse in the interest 
of “national security.”  What follows is an examination of how the interwar US Navy 
reacted to both a well-defined discourse about German submarines and a more loosely 
constructed, uncertain discourse surrounding American submarine warfare.  Ultimately, 
ambiguous policies about the weapons established a new discourse that was Silent as the 
Grave. 
When world leaders met at the Washington Naval Conference in late 1921 and 
early 1922, the use of submarines by the Hun dominated debates of the vessels’ abolition.  
At the end of December 1921, Literary Digest ran an article that easily faded into the 
static generated by the conference.  “Lost Submarines that Saved Themselves,” told the 
harrowing, noncombatant tales of two US submarines that suffered from accidental 
sinkings.115  Literary Digest noted that both crew’s actions were examples of “heroic 
manhood, expert skill, supreme self-sacrifice and lightning intelligence” that “add[ed] 
another incident to the heroic annals of the sea, to which the submarine has contributed 
more than its share.”116  The S-48 experienced an uncontrollable dive in late 1921 while 
                                                 
 
115
 “Lost Submarines that Saved Themselves,” Literary Digest, December 31, 1921, 32-6.  
 
116
 Ibid., 32.  
42 
cruising through Long Island Sound en route to New London, Ct.  After hours of back-
breaking work, the crew managed to create enough buoyancy in the bow to raise that 
portion of the ship out of the water.  In the case of the AL-4, however, human error 
played an equal role in creating the problem as human perseverance did in solving it.  
When a “green” sailor turned the wrong valve, the submarine began taking on 
unnecessary ballast and plunged nose-first into the mud, 294 feet below the surface of 
Bantry Bay, Ireland in 1918.  The Digest writers told their readers that both stories were 
important because “the work of our submarines during the war escaped without more 
than the briefest mention.”117  Considering that the defensively-deployed US submarines 
did not sink any ships during the war,118 it is unlikely that the 1921 article added much 
luster to the reputations of US submariners.   
The perception of US submarines as a relatively weak arm of the navy appeared 
throughout the decade that witnessed the First World War.  In 1910, a General Board 
planning aide directed that, in the event of war with Japan, twenty long-range (150 miles) 
submarines could deploy as defensives forces to guard the waters outside the naval base 
at Subic in the Philippines.119  Such a force, continued the aide, could render the entire 
base “well nigh impenetrable.”120  Three years later, theorists endorsed use of an on-shore 
fortress, coupled with a thick net of off-shore minefields and submarines, for the 
protection of Guam.121  War plans in 1917 allocated “a few troops and submarines to 
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police” the “unimportant and unendangered [sic]” area around Alaska.122  By the 1920s, 
however, planners dropped the entire area from the strategic War Plan Orange.123  On the 
surface, these examples appear progressive in that such an unpopular weapon featured 
prominently in the defense of – with the exception of Alaska – important South Pacific 
naval bases.  In truth, relegating an entire class of ships to defensive tasks in a navy built 
on the principles of ruthless offensive tactics equated to being a poor, beat cop in 
Prohibition Chicago. 
There were the occasional naval officers, though, who called for the expansion of 
the submarine’s role.  Notably, Lieutenant Chester Nimitz wrote, in 1912, an article for 
the US Naval Institute’s Proceedings that touted submarines of the “near future” as 
dangerous offensive weapons.124  Specifically, Nimitz declared that “the gradual 
improvement in the size, motive power, and speed of the submarine…will have a large 
part in deciding fleet action.”125  Immediately after the war, Captain Thomas Hart, head 
of Submarine Section, similarly pointed out to his superiors that “the submarine will be 
an extremely valuable weapon for…operations against Japanese commerce,” citing as a 
precedent the German use of USW in the preceding years.126  While the words of Nimitz 
and Hart spoke for a minority within the navy community – both were submariners – they 
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nonetheless indicate the beginnings of a multi-faceted discourse about the use of US 
submarines. 
The debate between offensive and defensive submarine theorists proved largely 
academic – no vessel in existence could meet the needs of large-scale fleet operations – 
until technological necessity reared its head.  Although the Washington Conference failed 
to abolish submarines outright, it did limit the tonnage a given navy could devote to the 
vessels.  More importantly for American war planners, the conference imposed 
limitations on the development of military bases, creating a need for new submarine 
development.  Article XIX of the treaty halted US military development of 
mandates/possessions west of the 180th meridian.127  The treaty therefore left the US with 
only one major fortified naval base in the Pacific – Pearl Harbor.  At 4850 miles from 
Manila and 3400 miles from Tokyo Bay, the location of this last outpost meant interwar 
period planners could no longer entertain ideas of creating permanent submarine bases in 
the South Pacific and reinforced the need for a long-range submarine.128   
As submarine development progressed to meet demands during the 1920s, the US 
Navy struggled to define the role of the vessels in any future war.  Shortly after the 
Washington Conference, the navy assigned Admiral Edwin Anderson, a veteran of the U-
Boat war, to Manila in order to create his own plans for the area.  Because development 
of an adequate long-range submarine was still a decade away from completion, Anderson 
clung to the defensive school of thought and reported back that a rapidly deployed 
                                                 
 
127
 Miller, War Plan Orange, 75.  
 
128
 Talbott, “Weapons Development,” 60.  
45 
submarine flotilla could hold Luzon in the event of war with Japan.129  Nearly six years 
later, drafts of War Plan Orange called for the deployment of fifty-one submarines from 
Pearl Harbor to the South Pacific during the first year of the war; however, such drafts 
also halted submarine sorties after the second month.130  Submarines, in this perspective, 
would be vital to initial operations in the Pacific, but their importance would lessen as the 
war progressed. 
As with the lack of cultural perception and clearly-defined strategy, the ambiguity 
of American submarine warfare filtered down to the country’s training facilities at New 
London, Ct.  The experiences of Ensign McFarland W. Wood demonstrate this 
phenomenon well.  Wood entered the submarine officer training program in January 1926 
and kept a record of his time in New London.131  Although the school’s workload often 
interfered with his ability to make daily entries, the young officer nonetheless revealed, 
through his journal, the strengths and weaknesses of the Connecticut-based “SUBSCOL.”  
When time permitted, Wood described the on- and off-base excursions of himself and his 
classmates, lending his voice to a generation of interwar submariners uncertain of their 
place within a modern navy. 
Upon his arrival at the SUBSCOL, Wood immediately noted that the intellectual 
rigors of the school rivaled those of civilian universities.  Instructors impressed upon their 
students from day one that the base at New London was “a taut school, and we are going 
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to have to work like the dickens” to succeed.132  After a brief inspection of the S-3 and S-
49, the school’s two practice submarines, Wood concluded that “running a sub is harder 
than I imagined, for it has to be balanced when under water to keep it from nosing to the 
bottom.”133  Such a statement implies that the contemporary American public would 
likewise be unaware of and have little appreciation for even the most basic technical 
intricacies of the vessels.  Wood himself was a graduate of the Naval Academy at 
Annapolis, MD – placing him within a small percentage of collegiate-trained Americans 
– yet he had given inadequate thought to the complex nature of submarines.  Like the 
larger discourse about American submarines, Wood’s own preconception was loosely 
constructed and far from definitive.  By the end of his first week, the ensign wearily 
acknowledged that “they have issued us more books to study here, then [sic] an ordinary 
person gets thru [sic] at college.”134  The Electrical and Communication Departments 
employed the most pedantic instructors on base as they “vied with each other to see 
which could issue the most books.  We’ve drawn about fifty texts – they figure we are 
blotters, evidently, as there are more to come, we are told.”135  The heavy course load at 
the SUBSCOL effectively turned officers and enlisted personnel into uniformed co-eds. 
 Despite providing a strong grounding in the theory of submarine warfare, the 
interwar SUBSCOL continuously suffered from depressed budgets that hampered hands-
on training.  According to a 1945 report, between 1916 and 1939, the school used 
equipment and training aids salvaged from decommissioned submarines.  Throughout the 
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period, “many difficulties were encountered in obtaining material for practical 
instruction.”136  Wood and his classmates experienced such “difficulties” firsthand.  Of 
the school’s two practice submarines, only one, the S-49, was operational at the time.  
During his first week of instruction, the aspiring submariner wrote “Subs again in the 
afternoon, we drew the S-3 today, with her engines all torn down.  Consequently the 
other two sections went out and had a dive where we didn’t.”137  At other times, the 
school’s antiquated equipment became a source of physical danger, rather than just a 
point of mere annoyance.  April entries in Wood’s diary note the following: 
Tuesday, 20; 
Fire alarm this morning at eight proved to be an explosion 
of the battery, (forward half) of the S-49.  Twelve men 
injured badly, four of whom died later from shock and 
infection of mutilated feet and legs.  The usual board of 
inquiry will be appointed, and try to determine the reason 
for the hydrogen collecting in the battery in explosive 
concentration. 
 
Wednesday, 21; 
Took a look over the smoldering ruins of the battery room 
of the S-49, just opened up, after smothering the fire.  The 
tops of the battery cells are all blown to kingdom come, but 
the plates are not hurt.  It will mean new jars, covers and 
connections, not such a terrible loss in dollars and cents as 
was anticipated.  Got quite a thrill when they were 
removing the cell connections as they arced heavily.  Glad 
there was no more hydrogen present at the time, or there 
would have been more fireworks than that.  About that time 
someone discovered that the can of torpedo detonators was 
still hanging on the bulkhead with one end off, supported 
by two little pieces of wire.  A chief put a board down to 
walk on, and got them out safely, giving them the deep six 
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at the end of the pier, which appeared to me to be the 
wrong thing to do.138 
 
Budget problems that interfered with training at New London certainly complicated the 
self-image of submariners.  On one hand, submarines were important enough to merit 
exorbitant intellectual preparation, but on the other hand, fiscal realities necessitated that 
students train on hand-me-down equipment that was inconvenient at best, and deadly at 
worst. 
 Using the well-defined discourse about another, newer branch of the military 
proved to be a somewhat useful, albeit frustrating, way to describe the nature of US 
submarine warfare.  Both submarines and airplanes came of age during the First World 
War, but discourse surrounding the two technologies differed greatly.  Contemporary 
Americans juxtaposed the sneaky methods of the former with the lofty, idyllic conception 
of the latter.  Submariners, like Wood, looked to air aces for the appropriate language 
with which to describe their own military experience.  After a brief, initial physical 
examination upon his entry to the SUBSCOL, Wood wrote that “the real test is later, 
much on the order of the aviation physical.”139  Likening the two fields to one another 
was not far-fetched; after all, they did share several similarities – the need for killer 
instincts, the often dangerous missions, and the magic of exploring new worlds beyond 
the scope of their contemporaries’ imagination.  Yet, according to Wood, submariners 
worked twice as hard as aviators and received only half the recognition: 
There is something very fascinating about the whales.  But 
I hate to think of having to wait at least a year to win one of 
the gold fish devices worn on the coat like aviator’s wings.  
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Denotes “qualified to command” – where the flyers get 
theirs when they are thru [sic] with their six months school, 
we are not even eligible until six months after we 
graduate.140 
 
Linking submarines and airplanes persisted throughout the interwar period and into the 
Pacific War.  At least within the military community, a discourse developed that 
reinforced Wood’s observations.  A 1942 poem by Richard Voge entitled, “Old Fuds, 
Young Studs and Lieutenant Commanders,” highlighted the fact that despite having 
similar missions, aviators and submariners enjoyed divergent reputations.141  The last 
lines of Voge’s poem conclude that 
Where’er you send the subs or planes, 
You’re bound to chalk up lots of gains –  
And losses, too, but what the hell, 
Who cares about their personnel? 
For planes are chauffeured by young studs, 
Lieutenant Commanders run the subs.142 
 
Both Wood and Voge used dominant perceptions about pilots to describe what 
submariners were not – sexy young aces who did little, yet received high acclaim.  
However, in detailing what submariners were not, both men failed to clearly discern what 
submariners actually were.   
 Not entirely devoted to life beneath the waves, Wood spent his spare time at New 
London moonlighting as a photographer.  To an extent, his hobby allowed him to 
augment his navy pay.  After receiving a royalty check from “P. and A.” for eight dollars 
and fifty cents, Wood remarked, “Not bad.  Wish I had some more to stick in and collect 
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on.”143  Money alone, however, was not the ensign’s sole reason for continuing his 
photographic aspirations at SUBSCOL: capturing life with his camera allowed Wood to 
exercise his artistic muscles.  A brief study break in January turned into a full-blown 
session of sorting negatives and planning future projects.  “My next album will not be in 
brown, but black, with the pictures done in a fine carbon print.  Lends more atmosphere, 
and sophistication [than] the way I have designed the present book.”144  Classroom 
discussions about the pomp and circumstance of his June graduation set Wood 
daydreaming about the summer Yale-Harvard river races and how he “ought to get some 
good pictures of them.”145  Even during training, Wood found time to take pictures.  
Bringing his camera along on a torpedo run in April 1926, Wood obtained permission to 
take the group’s torpedo retriever, a medium-sized boat used for capturing practice 
ordnance, away from the practice submarine in hopes of snapping a few shots of the 
vessel.  Heavy seas, however, made him reconsider the practicalities of such future 
endeavors.  “Next time I’m going to tie my camera on to me to negotiate a transfer like 
that, and not trust to luck, as I got two thrills when passing it across the open sea.”146  
Wood also enjoyed showing off his collection to friends, as well as photographing 
children at play in the navy community.147  Photography certainly afforded the officer a 
distraction from his studies, but it likewise added depth to his self-perception. 
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Following the London Naval Treaty of 1930, war planners and naval strategists 
slowly found their stride and continually tried, with varying success, to fit submarines 
into the pre-existing Mahanian doctrine of offensive war.  The lack of adequate surface 
speed, however, prevented submarine flotillas from sailing alongside the main fleet.  As a 
compromise, the navy began using the vessels as independent platforms, deployed to 
defend a given area of water.  Attacking from a defensive position allowed submariners 
to prove to their colleagues that they too could threaten enemy surface fleets.148  Slowly, 
American submarine commanders became more offensively minded, so much so that the 
navy issued a 1934 memorandum that restated the United States’ intentions to adhere to 
the rules set forth by the London treaty.149  Specifically, Article 22 of the treaty “rendered 
a shark a sitting duck” by forcing submarines to follow the same rules of commerce 
warfare as surface vessels – approaching on the surface, giving warning to the vessel, 
allowing the merchant sailors to evacuate, and then sinking the ship.150  However, 
discussions amongst officers regarding USW had begun to grow serious by the mid-
1930s.  Testifying before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs in 1934, Admiral 
George Day warned that “we must be prepared to discover that in war necessity 
acknowledges no law.”151  Less than a year later, Lieutenant Hyman Rickover believed 
that “it is almost certain that the submarine practices of the World War will be repeated in 
a future war.”152  Between 1937 and 1938, Admiral Harry Yarnell, Commander-in-Chief 
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Asiatic Fleet (CINCAF), continuously advocated a submarine war of “strangulation,” 
against the Japanese.153  International law and naval reality were fighting to a stalemate. 
As war approached, the need for additional submarine training became 
increasingly important to naval authorities.  On October 26, 1940, Admiral Harold Stark, 
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), sent a confidential letter that “requested the BuNav 
[Bureau of Navigation] to incorporate into the curriculum of the Submarine School a 
short advanced course for P.C.O.’s [Potential Commanding Officers] in attack 
technique.”154  Neither Stark nor the BUNAV clearly defined to what end (i.e. 
“traditional” versus “unrestricted” warfare) students of the course would use their new 
training.  The BUNAV’s reply, dated January 6, 1941, authorized the creation of a 
month-long course that would “increase knowledge of approach and attack methods by 
study and discussions, and technique [gleaned from] actual practice by experienced 
submarine officers who are slated to become commanding” or senior officers aboard 
submarines.155  Regardless of the specific course curriculum, the development of course 
itself was indeed timely.  By mid-April 1941, the first P.C.O. class, consisting of four 
officers, had graduated.156  Interestingly enough, the next month Stark approved the war 
plan titled “Rainbow 5,” allowing, in the event of war, US submarines to establish and 
maintain “strategical [sic] areas” of operations throughout Japanese waters in which ships 
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could conduct USW.157  Though the correlation between the creation of the P.C.O. course 
and the approval of “Rainbow 5” is, at best, circumstantial, it nonetheless made the move 
to USW more practical.   
While the United States and Japan teetered on the brink of war in 1941, the US 
Navy seesawed back and forth between following international treaties and pursuing 
commerce raiding vis-à-vis Unrestricted Submarine Warfare.  Analysis of the war plan 
drafts from March, designated Rainbow Three, suggest that planners had no intention of 
using submarines to attack Japanese shipping.158  Yet, only two months later Admiral 
Stark’s approval of Rainbow Five and its “strategical areas” created the possibility for 
USW.159  In July, four months prior to the official adoption of the “Germany First” 
strategy, the navy transferred approximately fifteen percent of the modern submarines 
stationed at Pearl Harbor to the Atlantic, leaving twenty-seven of the boats in Admiral 
Husband Kimmel’s increasingly cannibalized Pacific Fleet.160  Similarly, the Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) reassigned twelve submarines from Task Force 
(TF) Seven, Pacific Fleet (Pearl Harbor) to Admiral Thomas Hart’s Asiatic Fleet 
(Manila) in October.161  From their new location, sub skippers could better serve 
Rainbow Five’s plan to scout for the Japanese Combined Fleet near its home waters.  In 
the same month, the navy continued to issue directives forbidding unrestricted torpedoing 
“unless justified by events after the outbreak” of war, meaning that American 
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submariners would have to wait for Japan to draw first.162  In early November, the Asiatic 
Fleet received an additional eight modern submarines.163  On November 27, 1941, 
Admiral Stark, CNO, cabled Admiral Thomas Hart, CINCAF the only known prewar 
orders for USW: 
If formal war eventuates between U.S. and Japan quote 
Instructions for the Navy of the United States governing 
Maritime and Aerial Warfare unquote will be placed in 
effect but will be supplemented by additional instructions 
including authority to CINCAF to conduct unrestricted 
submarine and aerial warfare against Axis shipping…164 
  
Hart trusted that the CNO would make good on his promise.  Two hours after the 
Japanese surprise attack against the US Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor, Hart 
radioed to the Asiatic Fleet from his Manila headquarters to commence USW.165  Four 
hours later, Stark sent out an official message from Washington to “Execute unrestricted 
air and submarine warfare against Japan.”166  
 Despite any mixed intentions prior to Pearl Harbor, early prosecution of the 
submarine war against Japan proved that the US Navy had failed to prepare adequately 
for USW.  As the Japanese invasion forces swept across the South Pacific, submarine 
crews attached to the Asiatic Fleet did their best to stem the tide, with limited results.  In 
the month of March 1942, Asiatic submarines accounted for only two enemy ships sunk – 
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one tanker and one aircraft ferry.167  After the fall of Corregidor in early May, the navy 
assigned two officers, John Wilkes and Jimmy Fife, to compile a report assessing the 
successes and failures of the submarine offensive.168  The news in the report was not 
good.  The Wilkes-Fife Report estimated that, during the first four months of the war, 
submarine commanders had completed seventy-five war patrols, launching one hundred 
and thirty-six attacks that sank only thirty-six Japanese vessels.169  The report also 
surmised that for every ship sunk, commanders had expended nearly ten torpedoes.  
Postwar numbers gathered from captured Japanese documents revealed that the Wilkes-
Fife Report was overly optimistic.  In truth, submarines only accounted for ten sinkings 
during the period, shifting the torpedo-to-sinking ratio to a staggering thirty-to-one.170  
The main problem, determined the navy, was overly cautious skippers.  Because 
submarines operated independently from the fleet, prudent commanders all too often 
tucked tail and ran.  Rumors about cowardly captains quickly spread throughout the fleet.  
Inspired by such tales, torpedo officer Doug Rhymes penned a poem entitled, “The 
Fearless Skipper.”  Such a skipper, wrote Rhymes, never ran for cover “when everything 
is clear.”171   
With conversational courage 
He talks a fearless fight. 
He’s a rough, tough hombre 
When nothing is in sight. 
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All hazards of navigation 
Cause him no loss of sleep. 
He cruises along most calmly 
In water one mile deep. 
 
His nerves are surely made of steel, 
His voice has a confident sound, 
And he never gets excited 
When danger’s not around.172 
 
Despite a plethora of contemporary theories, the navy had no way of knowing in advance 
what kind of skipper any given officer would become.173  Through a painful series of trial 
by fire the navy slowly weeded out the ineffective commanders, and the submarine 
operations in the Pacific steadily improved.   
 Just like the country’s navy, the American public entered the war with an 
uncertain idea of what it was their submarines would do.  The lack of a well-defined 
cultural discourse meant that the wartime public needed an effective crash course in the 
navy’s wartime use of the vessels.  Interwar films about American submarines were few 
and far between, and did little to help the audience understand the nature of the United 
States Navy.  The 1928 film, Submarine, stands out only because of its director – the 
legendary Frank Capra.174  Submarine depicted the ships as instruments to complicate 
human drama.  When two navy friends discover that they both love the same woman, 
tensions run high.  After one sailor gets trapped in a submarine, his friend must rescue 
him, racked with guilt over their argument.  John Ford’s own excursion into the 
submarine genre, 1930’s Men Without Women, yielded similar results.175  Three years 
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later, Hell Below hit theaters as the first true, blue submarine film.176  Director Jack 
Conway gave audiences a taste of First World War naval battles, though he stretched the 
effectiveness of US submarines during the war.  The film’s fictional AL-14 engaged and 
sank an enemy destroyer – quite a feat, considering that the real US submarines of the 
First World War failed to accomplish as much.  Nonetheless, Hell Below at least gave 
American audiences a sense of what submarines could do in wartime: honorably fight 
enemy warships.  Still, cultural apathy for submarines during the Great Depression, 
coupled with a ten-year hiatus within the film genre, limited the impact the 1933 film 
exerted over cultural perceptions.   
 In January 1943, just barely a year after the Pearl Harbor attack, Hollywood – 
specifically, Twentieth-Century Fox – gave American audiences a much-needed guide 
for understanding the role of US submarines in the on-going war.  Crash Dive – starring 
Tyrone Power, Dana Andrews, and Anne Baxter – combined elements of the interwar 
sub-movies into an exciting, though highly propagandistic, wartime drama.177  The film 
created a love triangle between Power, Andrews, and Baxter, set against the backdrop of 
the New London Submarine Base.  Interspersed between romantic moments are the high-
flying battle and underwater scenes that earned the film a 1943 Academy Award for Best 
Special Effects.  Director Archie Mayo gave audiences a glimpse of the wartime navy, 
incorporating footage of real naval personnel at New London and other bases.  For the 
admittance fee audiences received 105 minutes of action, adventure, romance, laughter, 
and public service announcements.   
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 The movie began with a scene the audience could easily connect with a popular 
memory of the First World War: German U-Boats prowling for innocent victims along 
the Atlantic Coast.  As a lifeboat full of men, women, and children drift aimlessly across 
the ocean, a frail little boy comments that he hears a plane above.  The survivors strain to 
hear the plane’s engines, only to discover that the noise is, in fact, a flotilla of US PT 
Boats.  One PT Skipper, Lieutenant Ward Stewart (Tyrone Power), steers his boat toward 
the crowd.  While preparing to transfer the civilians aboard ship, the sailors spot a 
submarine periscope in the distance.  Racing to intercept the submerged ship, Stewart 
remarks, “Sub’s been stalking that lifeboat trying to knock off a rescue ship.  We’ll see 
what we can do for him.”178  Stewart and his crew successfully depth charge and sink the 
Hun submarine, gaining acclaiming in national newspapers.  Upon returning to port, 
Stewart receives orders to transfer immediately to New London. 
 The opening scene with the PT boats battling the U-Boat attached the film to 
previous cultural perceptions and began the process of steering the audience toward a 
new wartime discourse.  Filmmakers used the main character of Lt. Stewart as an on-
screen surrogate for the American public.  Upon arriving at New London, Stewart reports 
to the Commandant’s office, finding instead his Uncle Bob – a navy admiral.  While the 
two men discuss the events of the opening scene, Stewart brags, “That U-Boat never had 
a chance.  As a matter of fact, no submarine has much of a chance against those PT 
Boats.”179  Stewart’s words serve as reassurance that the US Navy could easily control 
the U-Boat menace.  As the conversation progresses, the admiral takes pains to point out 
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that submariners, at least American submariners, are good men who are much needed for 
the war effort, but that there is a serious shortage of trained officers.   
 The admiral’s comments proved valid in the real world.  A December 1939 letter 
from the Commander of the Submarine Force to the Bureau of Navigation 
“recommended that the Bureau’s policy for transferring previously qualified submarine 
men to recommissioned destroyers be discontinued,” as it had bled the service dry.180  
The fictional Stewart, for example, had trained as a submariner and served in that branch 
of the navy for two years before transferring to the larger “battle wagons” of the fleet.  
Despite Uncle Bob’s reasoning, Stewart frankly retorted that “As far as I’m concerned, 
it’s no life for a dog…even a sea dog.  I’d much rather sink ‘em than sail ‘em any 
day.”181  Stewart’s stance represented that of the American public: still not overly warm 
to submarines, and in need of some “reeducation.”  “Well, my boy,” Uncle Bob 
responded to Stewart, and ipso facto the audience, “looks like you’re gonna sail ‘em.”  
The young lieutenant furrowed his brow, dropped his shoulders, and let out a sigh of 
discontentment, not unlike a child who has just been told to eat his broccoli.  Like any 
fatherly figure, Uncle Bob smiles and tries to make Stewart understand: 
Uncle Bob: 
You think I’m tied to my desk in Washington because I 
enjoy it?  No, sir.  I’m serving where I’m needed most, and 
you’re being assigned where you’re needed most. 
 
 
Stewart (slowly shaking his head in acknowledgment): 
If I may say so, those PTs are a work of art! 
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Uncle Bob: 
So are the subs.182 
 
In order to be of use to the war effort, Stewart and the audience had to accept both their 
specific roles and the fact the submarines were a vital part of the navy. 
 The initial appearance of the film’s supporting character, Lieutenant Commander 
Dewey Connors (Dana Andrews), served to juxtapose the pristine ideals of Stewart with 
the stark realities of submarine warfare.  Standing on the New London docks, Connors – 
commanding officer of the USS Corsair – talks with the ship’s chief petty officer, both 
men frustrated that they have waited weeks for a new executive officer (XO) so that they 
could go on patrol.183  A day of manual labor aboard the Corsair had taken its toll on 
Connors’s appearance.  When the base commandant brings Stewart, slated to become 
Connors’s XO, to meet the ship’s captain, the disparity between the two men’s 
appearance becomes apparent.  Stewart, wearing a clean black uniform with his jacket 
pressed and tie straight, stood erect opposite his new commanding officer.  The 
disheveled Connors, his kaki work uniform wrinkled and dirty with oil smears, fished 
through his pockets, coming up with a crushed, empty cigarette pack.  Trying to be 
friendly, Stewart holds out his gleaming brass cigarette case as an offering to Connors.  
Director Archie Mayo let the shot of the two men facing each other linger a moment to 
drive home the differences between them – Stewart as the culturally reluctant submariner, 
and Connors as the bringer of a dirty reality.   
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 The contrasting worlds of Stewart and Connors intersect with the movie’s leading 
lady, school teacher Jean Hewlett (Anne Baxter), who serves as a conduit for debate 
between choosing what is safe versus what is right.  Hewlett, a teacher at a New London 
boarding school for girls, is the long-time girlfriend and not-quite fiancée of Lt. 
Commander Connors.  Early in the film, Hewlett takes a small group of her students to 
tour the nation’s capital at Washington, D.C.  Also headed to the busy wartime hub is 
none other than Lt. Stewart, having received weekend leave before reporting to the 
Corsair.  Hewlett and Stewart have their “meet-cute” aboard the D.C.-bound train.184  
After accidentally retiring for the evening in the wrong berth, Stewart is happily surprised 
to find a beautiful woman climbing into bed with him.  Hewlett, upon discovering the 
smiling young Stewart in her bed, is decidedly less-than-thrilled.  Once in D.C., Stewart 
learns that the tables have turned when he sees Hewlett begging the desk clerk at the 
Capitol Hotel for a room.185  The wily lieutenant phones the front desk and tells the clerk 
to give Hewlett his own room.  Stewart later arrives in his room, faking anger, and 
threatens to call a house detective in order to get to the bottom of Hewlett’s “treachery.”  
After allowing Hewlett to bat her eyelashes for a while, Stewart relents, “I’m against 
appeasement, as a rule, but in this case, I’m willing to discuss a negotiated peace.”  
Realizing that she’s been blackmailed into having dinner with the handsome stranger, 
Hewlett retorts, “That isn’t gold on your uniform – it’s brass.”  In spite of her 
reservations, Hewlett spends the night on the town with Stewart, not returning to the hotel 
until after 3am.   
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Hewlett’s encounters with the devil-may-care Stewart led her to question the 
stable life offered by a union with the careful Connors.  Back in New London, Hewlett’s 
girlfriend refers to Connors as Hewlett’s “Rock of Gibraltar,” and the “rocks” were worth 
marrying.186  Connors later tells Hewlett that they can get married after he becomes a 
fully-ranked commander, as the additional pay grade would cover both the wedding costs 
and “subsequent upkeep.”187  Still fearful of what may happen while waiting for 
Connors’s promotion, Hewlett quietly acquiesces to postpone marriage.  As the school 
teacher waits throughout the movie, she continues to encounter Stewart in New London.  
Eventually, the lieutenant wins over the object of his affection, giving her his Naval 
Academy class ring as sign of engagement.   
 Crash Dive’s love triangle serves both to entertain audiences and to promote an 
approach to life, and to war, that creates and seizes opportunities for victory.  In the 
movie’s on-shore world, Stewart’s bull-headed, unrelenting approach – though initially 
shocking – proves more capable than Connors’s more traditional, slow-but-steady 
courting methods.  Each man’s romantic personality spills over into the way with which 
he executes his official duties.  While on their first patrol aboard the Corsair, the two 
men and their crew spend over twenty days slowly combing a small section of the North 
Atlantic.  The impatient Stewart scoffs that he could sweep through the entirety of the 
same sea with a PT Boat in just half the time.188  A few days later, Connors bottoms the 
boat to avoid depth charges, opting to play it safe by playing opossum.  Again, Stewart 
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muses, “If only I were up there in one of those PT Boats.”  In an effort to fool the surface 
ship, Connors orders the crew to shoot trash through the torpedo tubes and pump fuel into 
the sea, creating a false debris field.  When Connors hits his head and loses consciousness 
after a nearby depth charge explodes, Stewart takes command and makes a daring run for 
the surface, torpedoing the enemy warship before it can sink the submarine.  Combining 
the ideals and tactics embodied by Stewart and Connors, the film suggested, would create 
a winning strategy.  Later on deck, Connors tells Stewart, “I’m thinking that someday 
they’ll make a torpedo [PT] boat that’ll submerge.”  “That’s funny you should mention 
that, Captain,” Stewart returns, “‘cause I’ve been thinking of a way to make a submarine 
go fifty knots.”  Like the real submariners in the early months of 1942, the fictional duo 
found that daring and tenacity, tempered with a bit caution, yielded winning results.   
 The film also revealed the importance of the sailors’ cultural identity.  According 
to the Vernian Model, submarines – and other vessels – assume society’s cultural 
perceptions about the men running them.  The enemy ship that forced Connors to bottom 
the Corsair was a German Q-Ship.  The British Navy created the Q-Ship concept during 
the First World War by converting merchant ships into heavily armed men-of-war.189  
Despite the use of “guile, trickery, and ambush” – words often associated with U-Boats – 
Britain praised the efforts Q-Ship commanders and their crews.190  The most celebrated 
such commander was Gordon Campbell, responsible for sinking three U-Boats with his 
deck guns.191  Fleet Admiral John Jellicoe reported that Campbell had “a record of 
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gallantry, endurance and discipline which has never been surpassed afloat or ashore.”192  
Ironically, one of Campbell’s gallant methods for tricking U-Boat commanders involved 
dressing a member of the crew in women’s clothing and instructing the sailor to carry a 
bundle that represented a baby.193  Nonetheless, British Q-Ships received admiration 
because they were British.  In Crash Dive, the perception of an evil submarine and a 
noble Q-Ship reverse to reflect the crews manning each vessel.  Such a role reversal 
allowed the film to modify and reinforce discourse that placed Americans within 
submarines. 
 As an educational experience for American cultural discourse, Crash Dive 
concluded with a review of the lessons the audience needed to remember during the war.  
When newly-wedded Stewart and Hewlett pay a visit to Stewart’s grandmother, they find 
Uncle Bob at the house as well.  Hewlett and the grandmother excuse themselves, 
allowing the two navy men a chance to chat about the war effort.  Stewart, once again 
assuming the role of the American public, begins explaining what his experiences aboard 
the Corsair have taught him.  In what quickly turns into a Public Service Announcement, 
Stewart extols that the various branches of the navy – from submarines and PT Boats to 
aircraft carriers and battleships – all have their own jobs to do.  Working in concert with 
each other, these elements of the modern navy will win the war together.   
And it isn’t all ships – it’s men.  The men behind the guns 
of the PT Boats, and the submarines, and the Coast Guard 
ships, and the minelayers, and the tenders, and the tankers, 
and the troopships.  The men that take them out, that fight 
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their way over and land them there.  That’s the navy – the 
United States Navy!194 
 
Although the movie did not create the perception of Americans manning submarines, it 
did encourage the audience to warm to the idea of a weapon with an uncertain wartime 
role. 
 The only other American wartime submarine film served to define the war with 
Japan and further complicate the perception of US submarines.  Destination Tokyo hit 
theaters in 1944, bringing with it a message that the war with Japan was one dominated 
by race.195  The film juxtaposed the God-fearing white Americans with the savage yellow 
Japanese.  The on-screen adaptation of the submarine reconnaissance mission completed 
for the Doolittle Raid starred Cary Grant as Captain Cassidy of the USS Copperfin.  
Preparing to depart from San Francisco on a secret mission, Cassidy writes to his wife.  
On his desk, the captain has three pictures – one each of his wife, daughter, and son – 
placed next to a book entitled Racial Theory.196  In his letter, Cassidy tells his wife that 
he hopes “the chicken pox didn’t leave any marks on that sweet face” of his daughter.  
Throughout the movie, sailors aboard the Copperfin continuously talk about sweethearts, 
mom, and apple pie – all the Americana “stuff” for which they fought.  En route to the 
Aleutian Islands, one sailor boasts that the ship will sink an astounding seventy thousand 
tons of enemy shipping.  When prodded by his mates as to why he is so optimistic, the 
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sailor replies, “Where I go there’s gonna be dead Japs.”197  Later in the Aleutians, the 
ship’s cook – who is conspicuously white, instead of black198 – muses while fishing, 
“You know, I’d sure like to hook an Aleutian salmon.  Cute if I opened him up and there 
was a Jap in there.  Fried Jap and tartar sauce.”  “I’ll take mine boiled in oil,” returns a 
nearby sailor.199  Racial slurs permeate the sailors’ dialogue, often times substituting 
“Japs” with “Nips” or “Snipes.”  Even the Captain fires off the occasional reference to 
the “Nips.”  Defining the war in such a way allowed filmmakers and audiences alike to 
justify and accept the methods that would bring the final victory. 
 Both Crash Dive and Destination Tokyo alluded to the “identity crisis” noted by 
historian Stephanie Cousineau.  Crash Dive included a scene in which a portion of the 
Corsair’s crew snuck into a secret Nazi base.200  During that point in the movie, the 
submariners became commandos and saboteurs.  As part of its mission in Destination 
Tokyo, the members of the Copperfin’s crew ran reconnaissance operations within Tokyo 
Bay and on the Japanese coastline as though they were spies.  Additionally, the Copperfin 
rescued a Japanese aviator in the Aleutian Islands, similar to its real-life counterparts who 
spent many wartime patrols fishing downed Allied pilots out of the Pacific.  Finally, both 
fictional submarines engaged in more traditional submarine roles: attacking and sinking 
enemy warships.  While neither film addressed the issue of commerce raiding, they 
nonetheless painted the submarine’s strategic role with broad strokes.  Additionally, both 
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films reinforced the need – under the guise of national security – for “silence.”  When the 
Copperfin returned from its harrowing adventures in Japanese waters, two men working 
on the Golden Gate Bridge spot the submarine.  “You think that sub down there saw any 
action?” asked one.  “Nah,” replied the other, “probably just out for a couple of practice 
dives.”201  No matter what submarines actually did – reconnaissance, rescue, sabotage, or 
battle – the Americans only needed to nod quietly in appreciation. 
 While the American public learned to accept the uncertain role of submarines, 
submarine commanders and crews likewise learned their craft of commerce raiding.  The 
slow start of 1942 yielded only 182 Japanese ships sunk.202  As more cautious sub 
skippers fell by the wayside and the remaining commanders adopted more practical 
approaches to commerce raiding, the American numbers improved.  Commenting on the 
failed tactics that hampered early attempts at commerce raiding, one submariner recalled 
years later: 
Say your objective is to contact all the commuters who live 
in a town outside New York.  The way they went about it 
would be comparable to going to each individual commuter 
in his home.  The most efficient way to find them is not like 
that but at the railway station when they’re all bunched 
together, trying to get on the same trains.203   
 
US submarines in the Pacific accounted for 135 vessels in 1943.204  1944 proved 
disastrous to the Japanese tanker fleet – completely obliterated by the submerged arm of 
the US Navy – along with the country’s other lost ships that numbered 603 during the 
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year.205  The numbers of sunken ships declined sharply in 1945 due to the fact that the 
Japanese merchant and military fleets had all but disappeared.  All told, US Submarines 
sank nearly five million tons of Japanese commercial vessels and half a million tons of 
warships.206  In the words of Theodore Roscoe, “The atomic bomb was the funeral pyre 
of an enemy who had been drowned.”207   
 The death of the Japanese Empire brought with it the death of an ambiguous 
American submarine discourse.  In the years immediately after 1945, writers – mostly 
submariners – took great strides to tell their countrymen about the numerous victories 
enjoyed by US submarines during the war.  Hollywood leapt on the increased postwar 
interest in Second World War seafaring stories, creating a boom in submarine-inspired 
movies.  As the US Navy slowly divulged the true extent of submarine activities in the 
Pacific, it helped replace the discourse about a branch of the military that was formerly 
“Silent as the Grave” with one that came to symbolize “The Flagship of Freedom.” 
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CHAPTER IV 
FLAGSHIP OF FREEDOM 
[The George Washington] is, like all nuclear powered 
submarines, a true submarine in the sense that it is not 
dependent on the earth’s atmosphere for its operation.  It, 
with its Polaris missile, is the first naval weapon system to 
be specifically designed for strategic employment against 
land targets and adds an entirely new dimension to our 
naval power.  Knowing the tremendous destructive 
potential of the lethal cargos that will be carried by 
submarines, no attacker could hope to escape retribution, 
even given the advantage of striking the first blow. ~ 
Wildred J. McNeil, Assistant Secretary of Defense, at the 
launching of USS George Washington, June 1959.208 
 
 American submarines of the Cold War had a clearly-defined purpose, generated 
by a well-articulated cultural discourse.  The submarine service’s previous search for 
identity ended as the threat of Soviet nuclear capabilities intersected with technological 
innovation and cultural embracing of submarines in the decade following 1945.  A 
veritable perfect storm had come together by the time that the George Washington put to 
sea in mid-1959.  First, writers began educating the American public as to the extent of 
submarine activities in the Pacific War – most notably Samuel Eliot Morison, Theodore 
Roscoe, and Edward L. Beach.  Although the popularity of the quasi-official histories 
published by Morison and Roscoe paled in comparison with that of Beach’s fictional 
writing, each author contributed to the post-war cultural buzz that Hollywood exploited 
with its submarine genre movies.  One of the twelve 1950s submarine films was MGM’s 
on-screen adaptation of Beach’s novel, Run Silent, Run Deep.209  In 1954, the same year 
that the Soviet Union detonated its first Hydrogen bomb, the US Navy commissioned its 
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first nuclear powered submarine, the not-so-fictional Nautilus.210  By 1957, the Navy had 
approved the creation of the Polaris Fleet Ballistic Missile program – the ultimate 
deterrent for checking Soviet aggression.211  Armed with Polaris-type Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), early Cold War US submarines could rain nuclear death and 
destruction in the event of a Soviet first strike.  All of these elements came together 
immediately after the Second World War to create the cultural discourse this study 
identifies as The Flagship of Freedom. 
 The roots of the Retaliatory School’s thesis first appeared with the outbreak of 
war in 1941.  On December 7th, Admiral Richmond Turner – head of the navy’s war 
planning division – commented that, “In retaliation for Japanese bombing of open towns 
in Oahu…orders had been given to U.S. Submarines in the Pacific to sink at sight 
Japanese merchant ships of all types.”212  When President Franklin Roosevelt addressed 
the nation on December 8th, he proclaimed that “No matter how long it may take us to 
overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will 
win through to absolute victory.”213  Although a few days later Roosevelt assured the 
nation that the war was not one of “vengeance,”214 his better-remembered Infamy Speech 
nonetheless provided a mandate that allowed for any and all means of victory, including 
Unrestricted Submarine Warfare.  During the Nuremburg trials in 1946, Admiral Chester 
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Nimitz, who assumed command of the Pacific Fleet following the Pearl Harbor attack, 
submitted an affidavit assuring that the submarine war in the Pacific had been “an act of 
reprisal against Japan.”215  The righteous might of justifiable wartime policies and tactics 
successfully laid the groundwork for postwar cultural discourse. 
 The earliest histories of the submarine war mimicked wartime rhetoric by filtering 
the memory of USW through the lens of justifiable retaliation.  Samuel Eliot Morison – 
the father of the Retaliatory School216 – began his 1949 discussion of American 
submarines with the acknowledgement that the country had, as a signatory of the London 
Naval Treaty, agreed to abide by the pre-existing laws governing commerce raiding by 
refraining from USW.217  Before delving into the country’s obvious flouting of 
international treaty, Morison provided his readers with a context for such actions. 
Treaty and doctrine alike went by the board on the first day 
of the war, when the Chief of Naval Operations issued the 
terse order, “Execute unrestricted submarine and air 
warfare against Japan.”  The enemy, by his calculated 
breach of treaties and international law at Pearl Harbor, had 
absolved the United States from observing any rule 
restricting methods of naval warfare unless dictated by self-
interest or the danger of retaliation.  After 7 December 
1941 combatant ships were still considered prime targets, 
but the employment of submarines to lance the arteries of 
enemy trade now became of major importance.218 
 
The same year, Theodore Roscoe published his own work on the submarine war, though 
his style of writing was harsher than Morison’s.  Roscoe’s work begins with chapter 
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entitled, “Holocaust at Pearl Harbor,” in which he gave a brief overview of the attack.219  
Moving on, the author asserted that “there were to be no merchant ships in the Pacific for 
the duration of the war.”220   
Armed or not, these merchantmen were in effect combatant 
ships.  “Transports,” “freighters,” “tankers” were hollow 
titles for auxiliaries of war, and it was the realistic duty of 
the submarine forces to reduce these ships to hulls as 
hollow as their titles.  The polite little law book went 
overboard.221 
 
Both authors maintained the veneer of justifiability by pointing to the official order for 
USW that CNO Stark issued six hours after the attack.  As the authors saw it, prior to 
December 7, 1941, the United States had no intention of using submarines as commerce 
raiders.  Intentions, real or perceived, helped guide early postwar memory of the 
submarine campaign. 
 At the outset of the 1950s, Hollywood’s “Decade of the Submarine”222 began and 
effectively cornered the market of postwar submarine memory.  During these ten years, 
audiences had frequent opportunities to experience the on-screen submarine war in the 
form of twelve movies dedicated to wartime plots.223  Nearly all of these films had the 
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same style of high-tension, fast-paced dramatic storylines.224  Although every submarine 
movie in the period helped to join the world of scholarly history with that of popular 
memory, the film Run Silent, Run Deep did so more than its comtemporaries.  
In 1955, Commander Edward L. Beach published a fictional account of the 
underwater Pacific War entitled, Run Silent, Run Deep.225  A veteran of the war, Beach 
had served as executive officer aboard the Trigger and Tirante, and in 1945 assumed 
command of his own ship, the Piper.226  Beach’s credentials were impeccable: second in 
his class at Annapolis (1939), first in his class at New London’s SUBSCOL, successfully 
completed over ten war patrols, and known as “one of the outstanding young submariners 
of all times.”227  At the beginning of his novel, the author told readers that “the 
motivation, events, and action herein set forth are representative of that brave period 
between 1941 and 1945 when many of us unwittingly realized our highest purpose in life.  
To that extent, and with these qualifications, this book, though fiction, is true.”228  When 
executives at MGM released their adaptation of Run Silent, Run Deep in 1958, they gave 
audiences a movie saturated with the main theme that dominated the 1950s subgenre of 
war films: justified USW executed by courageous submariners. 
 The director and producers of Run Silent, Run Deep made it clear that US 
submarines had operated under orders to sink both Japanese military and merchant ships.  
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In the film’s opening scene, Commander PJ Richardson (Clark Gable) attacks a Japanese 
convoy of merchant ships before an explosion destroys his submarine in turn.229  A year 
later, Richardson commands the submarine Nerka and heads back to the same area to find 
and sink the enemy destroyer, nicknamed Bungo Pete, believed responsible for the 
sinking of four US submarines.  Giving the crew a summary of their orders, Richardson 
says, “Number one, and I’m sure you’ve heard this many times, sink enemy shipping.”230  
Upon arriving in his designated area of operations, Richardson spots a destroyer escorting 
a tanker and quickly devises his plan of attack.  “We’ll wait until the destroyer passes 
clear, then we’ll take on the tanker.”231  After taking out the tanker, the captain turns 
straight toward the warship, firing a spread of torpedoes that strikes the ship along the 
bow causing it to sink.  Toward the movie’s end, the Nerka engages in an underwater 
standoff with a Japanese submarine guarding a convoy.  The US crew realizes that there 
is only one way to win – force the enemy to the surface by attacking the convoy of 
merchantmen.  The tactic pays off, and the Nerka lives to continue its campaign of 
attrition.   
 While the practice of USW pervades the film’s plot, Run Silent, Run Deep – like 
the works of Morison and Roscoe – provided viewers with a context to justify such 
tactics.  After a failed attempt to defeat Bungo Pete, the Nerka turns toward Pearl Harbor.  
Listening to a transmission by Tokyo Rose in which she claims that the submarine sank, 
executive officer Jim Bledsoe (Burt Lancaster) finds it odd that she lists the names of the 
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crew, even calling one man by a nickname he earned on patrol!  A quick investigation 
reveals that Japanese fishermen must have gone through the submarine’s overboard trash 
and alerted the Imperial Navy to the Nerka’s presence.  By including this subplot, the 
film made Japanese civilians complicit in military actions and therefore fair game.  The 
movie built on these images of sneaky Japanese naval tactics with the revelation of how 
Bungo Pete had managed to sink the previous four submarines sent into the Bungo 
Straits.  With the odds stacked against the Americans, audiences could sympathize with 
the wartime practice of USW. 
 Run Silent, Run Deep also addressed the wartime problem of overly-cautious 
skippers.  As the Nerka heads out on patrol, Richardson subjects the crew to constant 
drilling.  One night a watchmen spots an enemy submarine off the stern running 
perpendicular to their location, but Richardson orders the crew to maintain their course.  
Bledsoe warns the captain that the Nerka “hates showing her backside” to the enemy.232  
Below decks, the crew debates Richardson’s actions.  “That Jap sub and all these drills – 
the captain must be runnin’ scared,” worries the cook.  Another sailor jokes, “You’re all 
confused, my friend.  We’re on a drill patrol, here.”  Continuing on, he teases that 
Richardson plans “to challenge the Japs to a drill.  The winner’s gonna get an all-expense 
paid honeymoon trip with Tokyo Rose in the Bungo Straits.”  Even the officers express 
frustration at running from a fight.  One man sarcastically exclaims, “Let us pay tribute to 
that great motto: caution with safety and safety with caution,” as he raises a glass to the 
“drill master.”  Privately, Bledsoe confronts Richardson. 
It’s one thing to drill a crew for fighting, but when you 
duck a Jap sub they wonder why they should break their 
backs on drills when the captain has no stomach for 
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attacking.  “What does he want?  Obedience?  Effeciency?  
Or the best drill cowards in the navy?” 
 
In a scene reminiscent of Doug Rhymes’ wartime poem, “The Fearless Skipper,” Run 
Silent, Run Deep showed audiences that there was no place in the navy for “drill 
cowards.”  When taken together, submarine films of the 1950s like Run Silent, Run Deep 
used postwar memory to garner support for a new breed of submariners who emerged as 
Cold Warriors. 
 While the American public underwent a decade-long cultural education courtesy 
of Hollywood, the navy prepared to unveil its first line of defense against a contemporary 
Soviet threat.  When the USSR detonated its first Hydrogen bomb in 1954, it brought 
with it a renewed fear of nuclear destruction.233  In November 1955, the Department of 
Defense ordered a joint Army-Navy project to develop a “fifteen hundred-mile 
intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM)” called Jupiter.234  Because no existing solid 
fuels could handle an IRBM payload, Jupiter missiles relied on liquid fuel, making them 
large – too large for submarines – and cumbersome.235  In the hopes of mating ballistic 
missiles with the newly commissioned nuclear submarines, director of the navy’s Special 
Projects Office, Admiral William Rayborn, approved a long-range, solid-fuel missile 
system, Polaris, in late 1956.236  Before the navy could officially begin Polaris 
development, Rayborn had to gain the approval of Defense Secretary Charles Wilson.  In 
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a meeting with Wilson, Rayborn illustrated how the move to a solid-fuel missile would 
save half a billion dollars in transport cost by requiring fewer ships to move the smaller 
weapon.  The heretofore unimpressed Defense Secretary perked up and said with a smile, 
“You’ve shown me a lot of sexy slides, young man, but that’s the sexiest, that half-billion 
dollar saving.”237  By January 1, 1957, the navy had approved the “sexy” Polaris Fleet 
Ballistic Missile program. 
 In order to underscore the strategic importance of Polaris submarines, the navy 
broke a long-standing tradition of naming the vessels for marine life.  Chief of the Bureau 
of Naval Personnel Vice Admiral H.P. Smith announced in October 1958 that, under 
White House directive, new submarines would bear the names of “distinguished 
Americans who were known for their devotion for [sic] freedom.”238  Commanders James 
Osborn, Harold Shear, and William Simms, all veterans of the Pacific submarine war, 
would command the George Washington, Patrick Henry, and Theodore Roosevelt, 
respectively.239  Additionally, Smith noted, these new submarines would have two 
dedicated crews – designated “Gold” and “Blue” – that would enable the ships to stay at 
sea longer, with briefer stays in port.  As soon as one crew departed, their counterparts 
would board the submarine with fresh provisions and redeploy.240  Symbolically, the 
message was strong: the nation’s revered forefathers would keep a constant vigil and 
protect their descendants during the uncertain days of the Cold War.  By 1966, a 
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projected total of forty-one Polaris submarines would stand guard over the nation, 
earning the nickname, “41 For Freedom.”241 
 Although the new defenders of freedom met with a favorable response, a 1961 
naval directive indicated the fragility of public perception at the dawn of the Polaris age.  
In November of that year, historian Samuel Flagg Bemis dropped a bombshell on the 
naval community.  At the Naval War College, Bemis presented a paper entitled, 
“Submarine Warfare in the Strategy of American Defense and Diplomacy, 1915-1945,” 
in which he revealed that the navy had decided to conduct a campaign of USW weeks, 
perhaps months, before the Pearl Harbor attack.242  Bemis’ argument directly attacked the 
Retaliatory School’s thesis and undermined the popular memory of the war formed 
during the 1950s.  The navy blocked any possibility of publication by classifying the 
research until 1978.  Reluctantly, Bemis hid his work from the world, writing that “It is 
not considered in the public interest to publish this study at the present time.”243  The 
“time” of which Bemis wrote was indeed a precarious moment in the American 
submarines’ history – the George Washington was less than two years old, the navy had 
begun receiving installments of the Ethan Allen-class Polaris systems, and thirty-one of 
the “41 For Freedom” still required extensive funding.  With Bemis’ discovery locked 
away, the American public had no reason to question the glorious history of American 
submarines in the Pacific War, and ipso facto, in the current Cold War.  Building on the 
pristine and guarded reputation of this latest generation of submariners, the navy could 
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meet unforeseen Soviet threats with continuing advances in submerged warfare that 
enjoyed growing popularity among the nation’s citizenry. 
 As the navy readied the last Polaris submarine for duty in 1966, the Pentagon 
began studying its possible replacement.  In response to the potential of increasingly 
advanced Soviet ICBMs, the two-year study designated “Strat-X” explored a range of 
next-generation deterrents, including the Trident ballistic missile.244  Official research 
and development of Trident and a platform to carry and deploy it began in 1967.  Over a 
decade of refinement went into producing the “quietest, fastest, and deadliest ballistic 
missile submarine (SSBN) in the world.”245  Finally, in 1981, the navy officially received 
the duty-ready lead boat of the Trident generation – Ohio.246  By creating yet another 
naming precedent with the latest nuclear deterrent, the navy shifted its evocation of 
cultural images from America’s past to its present, directly enlisting the country’s 
citizenry as Cold Warriors.  By the fall of the Soviet Union in late 1991, the navy had 
commissioned eleven more Trident submarines – the final two being West Virginia 
(1990) and Kentucky (1991).  A case study of how West Virginians reacted to news of the 
forthcoming submarine reveals broad trends that characterized submarine discourse in the 
late Cold War.247 
 Early efforts to name a nuclear submarine after the Mountain State reveal regional 
competition and patriotic yearnings.  Within two weeks of the Ohio’s launching, Ruth 
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Campbell – mother of Commander Arlie Campbell, Ohio’s Potential Commanding 
Officer (PCO) – wrote to her senators, Jennings Randolph and Robert Byrd, to ask a 
favor.248  In the letter to Randolph, Campbell described the other submarines she had seen 
at the launching.249  After noting that work was already underway on the Michigan and 
Georgia, the housewife told the senior senator, “Please do use your influence to get the 
3rd Trident named the West Virginia – wouldn’t that be wonderful?”250  Randolph’s reply 
arrived a few weeks later, bearing the news that he had “written the Secretary of the Navy 
and the Chief of Naval Operations to urge that the third Trident submarine be named the 
West Virginia.”251  Despite Randolph’s swift actions, the US Navy was slow to move; by 
the time the senator retired in 1985, no plans to name a submarine after the state had 
materialized.  Finally, at the urging of Senator Byrd in 1987, the Secretary of the Navy 
agreed to the idea originally put forth by Campbell.252  Byrd called the announcement 
“great news.  West Virginians have a distinguished history of patriotism and service to 
their country, and it is fitting to name this Naval [sic] vessel in honor of our state.”253  
Noting that the state ranked first in the number of deaths for both Korea and Vietnam, as 
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well as fourth for the Second World War, Byrd concluded that the new submarine 
represented “a well-deserved recognition of their sacrifices.”254 
Fostering a bond between the vessel and its namesake state became an on-going 
task for naval and political leaders, but perhaps the most intimate connection came with 
the news that six West Virginians, two officers and four crewmen, would serve aboard 
the submarine.  Citizens of Hampshire County were “very proud of one sailor that is in 
the vessel’s crew,” Kelly J. Jaeger.255  Jaeger, a former “outstanding student and athlete at 
Hampshire,” was a missile technician assigned to the West Virginia.256  The Hampshire 
County native described the new ship as “a Cadillac of the fleet” that would bear its name 
well.257  In a newspaper article, large pictures of the submarine featured prominently 
alongside pictures of Jaeger with his wife and baby.  Reinforcing the idea of familial 
pride, the Hampshire Review observed that Jaeger’s grandmother, Dakota Caldwell, 
“beamed with pride last week as she talked of the upcoming events and the chance to see 
her grandson once again.”258  West Virginia was more than a pile of high-tech metallurgy; 
by serving as the home of actual state natives, West Virginia became West Virginia.   
Prior to the christening and commissioning, Captain James Harvey and his crew 
took a proactive approach to ensure that their sponsor state formed a close relationship 
with the submarine.  During Memorial Day weekend of 1989, Harvey and three crewmen 
enjoyed a visit to their sponsor city of Wheeling where they were special guests of the 
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mayor and American Legion Post One.259  The crew made frequent visits to the state: 
spending time at the West Virginia Children’s Home; participating in the Cherry River 
Navy Maneuvers at Richwood, WV; whitewater rafting along the New River; serving as 
guests at the annual Sternwheel Regatta in Charleston and the Italian Heritage Festival in 
Clarksburg.  The state’s land-grant school, West Virginia University, hosted a special 
Navy Day as part of the West Virginia-South Carolina football game in Morgantown on 
September 15, 1989.260  Twenty-five crewmen, along with Admiral Arlie Campbell and 
other officers, spent the day as personal guests of University President N.S. Bucklew.  
Both the crew and the state’s citizenry did their part to embrace one another as friends 
and family.  Harvey wrote that his goal was “to better acquaint us about this great state 
and its citizens and most importantly acquaint the state’s citizens with their new Trident 
Submarine that will inherit the history and the proud name of the previous USS WEST 
VIRGINIA (ACR-5) and USS WEST VIRGINIA (BB-48).”261 
Harvey may not have realized it at the time, but the history of the West Virginia 
(BB-48) was inescapable.  The designation BB-48 identified the submarine’s predecessor 
as a battleship.  On the morning of December 7, 1941 West Virginia sat in the water of 
Pearl Harbor, caddy-cornered from the Arizona.  Like its sister, West Virginia sank from 
damages sustained during the Japanese attack; however, the navy raised and repaired the 
ship. 
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Like a vengeful ghost reappearing from the dead, the USS 
WEST VIRGINIA (BB48) rose from the murky bottom of 
Pearl Harbor to unleash a retaliatory fury on the enemy for 
a full year preceding the Japanese surrender.262 
 
The navy decorated the battleship with five battle stars for its actions in the Pacific War.  
Every year, West Virginia newspapers remind readers of the state’s connection to Pearl 
Harbor, keeping the memory of the battleship alive.  When news spread about the new 
Trident West Virginia, every article referenced the ship’s predecessor and its phoenix-like 
story.263  Coverage of the christening ceremony explicitly linked the past and present with 
a photograph that showed two veterans from the battleship standing alongside Captain 
Harvey and Admiral Campbell.264  Commemorative prints sold at the commissioning 
showed the new submarine sailing side-by-side with the battleship.265  The linked 
memory of the battleship and the discourse about the submarine made the new West 
Virginia the latest defender of freedom. 
The memories of the Second World War likewise echoed with the appointment of 
the Governor’s Commissioning Committee.  West Virginia Governor Gaston Caperton 
created the special committee to oversee the logistics of the commissioning ceremony.266  
To head up the group, Caperton appointed prominent citizen C.E. “Bert” Goodwin.267  
Goodwin hailed from the small West Virginia town of Ripley, a place where, during the 
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Depression, young men spent free time playing “kick-the-can at night and 
chas[ing]…girls into dark places.”268  When war came to the isolated town in December 
1941, Goodwin burst through the doors of the local Episcopal Church shouting, “The 
goddamned Japs have bombed Pearl Harbor!”269   Goodwin remembered well the 
treachery of “sneaky” tactics and would not have been party to a group promoting an 
underhanded weapon.  As such, his presence on the committee reveals the changed 
perception of submarines.  Serving as Goodwin’s co-chair was Hershel “Woody” 
Williams, a native born West Virginian and former Marine.  During the fighting on Iwo 
Jima in 1945 Williams took out several enemy pillboxes single-handedly; for his actions, 
Williams received the Medal of Honor.270  As with Goodwin, Williams’ “stamp of 
approval” demonstrates that the popular perception of submarines during the period was 
one of an honorable vessel that defended freedom. 
Throughout the late-1980s, ordinary West Virginians also found ways to leave 
their imprint on the history of the new Trident submarine.  Across the state, public school 
students worked feverishly to design and draw the West Virginia’s logo.271  The design 
submitted by sixteen-year-old Jason Barnard, a junior at Washington Irving High School 
in Clarksburg, beat out over a thousand other entries in the competition.272  Barnard’s 
winning logo featured an eagle clutching a rhododendron flower set against a background 
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of mountains.  To the artist, the state’s flower represented West Virginia’s beauty and the 
eagle embodied freedom.273  On the other end of the state, workers at the family-owned 
Casto and Harris book manufacturer in Spencer toiled away to create a special visitor’s 
log.274  The log, weighing fourteen pounds and measuring 71”x13”x2.5”, kept four 
artisans busy for some twenty hours.  With an estimated value of $800-$1000, the 
memento boasted five hundred linen pages with hand-sown leather binding and marble 
edging.  The president of Casto and Harris, Clay Miller III, had the honor of presenting 
the log to the ship’s company at the commissioning ceremony.275   
Even the flavors of West Virginia found prominent roles at the formal exercises.  
Russ Tuckwiller, owner of the Charleston-based restaurant Esquire, oversaw the food 
planning for the commissioning in Kings Bay, Georgia.276  The logistics of feeding an 
expected five thousand attendees included “dispatching a refrigerated truck with 1,500 
pounds of meat including 300 pounds of country ham.”277  Because approximately one-
fifth of those in attendance would be West Virginians, Tuckwiller wanted to feature state 
dishes, including: smoked ham, roast beef, biscuits, rolls, Tuckwiller’s homemade 
sausage, sausage from Mama Jarroll’s Country Road Inn (Summersville, WV), West 
Virginia-grown apples, brown beans and cornbread, and local Briar Run goat cheese.278  
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The all-important christening champagne came from Hampshire County, courtesy of the 
West Virginia Grape Growers’ Association.279  Officials at General Dynamics, Electric 
Boat Division – the traditional builders of navy submarines – took great pains to ensure 
that the special Hampshire bubbly did its job.  After enjoying morning coffee on the day 
of the christening, ship’s sponsor Erma Byrd took a few practice swings with a wooden 
bottle.280  For the actual christening, Mrs. Byrd used a pre-cracked bottle wrapped in a 
protective mesh netting.  “If by chance the bottle would not break, there is a standby 
bottle that will be immediately broken on the ship to insure the Christening has taken 
place.”281  The planners left nothing to chance. 
Amidst the pomp and circumstance of the christening and commissioning, the 
submarine’s mission was clear.  Kelly Jaeger agreed with the Hampshire Review’s 
observation that the submarine was “part of the first line of defense of our country,” 
noting that “that’s our job – to stay at sea and be submerged, undetected, for the largest 
amount of time possible.”282  At the ship’s christening, Senator Byrd admonished, “If we 
ever were to launch the missiles of the West Virginia, our basic goal, to deter war, would 
have failed.”283   
 The same year of West Virginia’s commissioning (1990), audiences across the 
country experienced the beginning of a submarine film revival.  In March, executives at 
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Paramount Pictures released the much-anticipated on-screen adaptation of Tom Clancy’s 
bestseller, The Hunt for Red October.284  When a new Soviet submarine called Red 
October puts to sea in 1984, CIA analyst Jack Ryan (Alec Baldwin) rushes to ascertain 
the purpose of the mysterious doors located at the ship’s bow and stern.  Shortly after 
learning that the doors house a nearly-silent propulsion system that would render it 
capable of thwarting the country’s first-warning systems, Ryan finds himself giving a 
top-secret briefing to the president’s National Security Advisor Jeffrey Pelt (Richard 
Jordan).  Acting on intelligence that the ship’s captain, Marko Ramius (Sean Connery), 
has gone rogue and intends to fire his ballistic missiles at the United States, the joint 
chiefs at the meeting decide they must protect their shores at all costs.  Ryan offers an 
alternative scenario – Ramius could be defecting!  Secretly, NSA Pelt orders Ryan into 
the field, giving him forty-eight hours to prove his theory and intercept the Red October 
before the Soviet fleet could do the same.  The movie took audiences through an action-
packed race against time that helped bridge the gap between submarine discourse and 
late-Cold War reality. 
 The Hunt for Red October brought with it a message of peace to an America that 
had endured forty long years of the Cold War.  While Ryan and retired submariner Skip 
Tyler (Jeffrey Jones) discuss the implications of Red October’s silent capabilities, Tyler’s 
character invokes past and present fears of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). 
When I was twelve, I helped my daddy build a bomb 
shelter in our basement because some fool parked a dozen 
warheads ninety miles off the coast of Florida.  This thing 
could park a couple a hundred warheads off Washington or 
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New York, and no one would know anything about it till it 
was all over.285 
 
The memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the senselessness of nuclear war are 
evident in Tyler’s words.  After Ryan classifies Red October as a potential first-strike 
weapon, an older admiral on the Joint Chiefs of Staff hangs his head saying, “God-
damned thing’s made to start a war.”286  The admiral’s age suggests that he had lived 
through previous war(s) and was fearful of a new one characterized by the use of nuclear 
weapons.  Aboard the aircraft carrier Enterprise, Admiral Painter (Fred Thompson) 
assesses the dangers of having the American and Soviet fleets in close proximity to one 
another.  “This business will get out of control.  It will get out of control, and we’ll be 
lucky to live through it.”287  The film placed the precarious nature of living in a MAD 
world in the foreground of Cold War submarine discourse. 
Sean Connery’s portrayal of Captain Marko Ramius similarly invoked the 
perception that the arms race had long since grown futile and perilous.  Ramius tells his 
crew that they play “a dangerous game – a game of chess against our old adversary, the 
American Navy.”288  Privately, Ramius’ executive officer and co-defector Vasili Borodin 
(Sam Neil) talks with the captain about his ambitions for living a free life in America.  
When Borodin asks the captain about his future plans in their new home, Ramius thinks 
for a minute before quietly replying: 
I miss the peace of fishing – like when I was a boy.  Forty 
years I’ve been at sea.  A war at sea.  A war with no battles, 
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no monuments – only casualties.  I widowed her the day I 
married her.  My wife died while I was at sea, you 
know?289 
 
Ramius’ description of his war at sea, representing the larger Cold War, painted a dark 
picture of a war that was devoid of all recognizable symbols, save for the dead.  At the 
movie’s end, Ramius finally reveals to Ryan his reasons for defecting.  According to the 
captain, there were individuals in Russia who believed that the only way to settle tensions 
with America was with a massive attack – “Red October was built for that purpose.”290  
In messianic fashion, Ramius sacrificed his life, career, and homeland to save the world 
from absolute destruction.   
Despite Red October’s strong message of peace, it also reinforced the dominant 
cultural perception of American submarines as the country’s first line of defense.  In the 
film, American submarine USS Dallas291 first detects Red October coming out of port.  
When the Soviet submarine’s crew activates their new propulsion system, sonar 
equipment aboard the Dallas loses the ability to track Red October.  After spending hours 
filtering through sea-generated sound, sonar technician Seaman Jones (Courtney Vance) 
figures out how to track the untraceable submarine.  Jones’ determination and good ole 
American know-how prove smarter than high-tech sonar gear, and he also correctly 
anticipates Red October’s course.  The fictional Seaman Jones represented real American 
submariners whose technical skills and abilities to adapt, overcome, and improvise 
guarded the country’s spheres of influence.  Later, when Ryan and a few members of 
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Dallas’s crew board the Red October, they come under torpedo attack from another 
Soviet submarine, the Konovalov.  While Ryan and Ramius search for a saboteur, Dallas 
Captain Bart Mancuso (Scott Glenn) takes command of Red October.  Having no way to 
fire his torpedoes, Mancuso must beat the Konovalov with grit and nerves of steel alone.  
Although the ensuing undersea battle was less far-fetched than Chuck Norris round-
housing Vietnam into submission, the point was clear – give an American a free hand, 
and he will find a way to win.   
American submarines of the Cold War were the right weapons, at the right time, 
under the right conditions.  Postwar scholarship and popular memory – joined together by 
Theodore Roscoe, Edward Beach, and Hollywood – created an historical precedent of 
honorable American submarines and submariners.  Nuclear proliferation and the potential 
for mutually assured destruction provided a niche for advanced submarine technologies.  
As the navy’s censorship of Samuel Flagg Bemis protected the submarine’s fragile 
reputation in the early 1960s, so too the symbolic joining of Trident submarines with 
states’ names in the latter years of the Cold War ensured that American submarines 
continued to enjoy an illustrious reputation.  But ultimately, the golden age of the 
submarine could not endure without a purpose. 
The commissioning of the West Virginia and the production of The Hunt for Red 
October marked the last years of The Flagship of Freedom.  With the official dissolution 
of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 came a cultural uncertainty that chipped away at 
the clearly-defined discourse birthed by the Cold War and the threat of nuclear attack.  
The submarine revival in Hollywood initiated by Red October continued throughout the 
1990s and into the early 2000s, but it also revealed a diverse cultural perception of 
91 
submarines.  Unlike the decade of the submarine during the 1950s, this new interest in 
the vessels included a wide array of films that were serious, comedic, historically-based, 
and fantastic.  For example, the 1996 comedy Down Periscope directly juxtaposed – in 
both title and content – the more straight-forward Second World War-based film Up 
Periscope from 1959.292  Much like the interwar and Second World War periods, the 
post-Cold War years initiated a search for identity.  Without a clearly defined threat, 
submarines lost their purpose. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The historian has no crystal ball.  As he approaches the 
cresting edge of history’s wave, he must fall silent. 
    ~ Paul Boyer, 1985293 
 
 The cultural discourse about and the historical realities of American submarine 
warfare did not occur in a vacuum.  Although this particular study does have a definite 
beginning and end, the historical phenomenon explored herein does not.  For centuries 
prior to the First World War, humanity gazed across the surface of the sea and wondered 
what lies beneath.  And indeed, it is farcical to presume that the human fascination with 
the earth’s oceans will magically cease at some distant point in the future.  But what 
makes the American cultural experience with submarines in the twentieth century so 
fascinating is the fluidity and flexibility shown by both public perceptions and official 
policy making.  Americans saw no inherent contradiction in reprimanding Germany for 
its use of USW and then adopting the same practice some twenty years later.  In large 
part, the difference between First World War abhorrence and Second World War 
acquiescence derived from perceptions about the men inside submarines – evil Germans 
versus noble Americans.  Yet in the Cold War, quiet acceptance turned to exuberant 
acclamation as submarines held the key to maintaining some measure of world peace, at 
least when it came to preventing the absolute destruction promised by nuclear holocaust.  
Instead of mere changes in political and military policies and doctrines, the moves from 
victims to users to noble defenders represent dramatic cultural shifts that took years, if 
not decades, to form.   
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Even today, the public perception and strategic role of American submarines 
continue to evolve.  Since the end of the Cold War, the navy has retro-fitted four of the 
original Ohio-class Trident submarines with cruise missiles for use in strategic air strikes, 
such as the recent 2011 Libyan Civil War.  Continued nuclear proliferation and ever-
straining relations with countries like North Korea and Iran, however, have also allowed 
true Trident submarines like the West Virginia to partially resume Cold War roles of 
deterrence.  While the submarine’s story cannot definitively predict the future of weapons 
development and deployment, it does reveal the importance of cultural influences on war 
making.  And, to a point, the history of American submarines illustrates how the need for 
national security during wartime (e.g., the secrecy of the Silent Service) can spill over 
into the postwar world, railroading intellectual freedom to protect public opinion of new 
weapons (e.g., Bemis’ censorship and deployment of Polaris submarines). 
Military applications of submarines, however, only tell part of the story.  The 
dream of submerged vehicles did not begin, nor will it end, with the desire to fashion new 
weapons of war.  One only needs to turn on a television in today’s world to find examples 
of the scientific advances brought about by modern submarines.  The Discovery Channel, 
Animal Planet, the History Channel, and Public Broadcasting networks all air programs 
in which scientists explore the deep in privately-owned one- or two-man submersibles.  
Documentaries about Robert Ballard’s discovery of the Titanic shipwreck, or even 
Hollywood’s fictional love story Titanic, all reinforce the wondrous potential of undersea 
exploration.  Jules Verne’s Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea has been the subject 
of five full-length films bearing the same name, not to mention that Captain Nemo and 
Nautilus have appeared in at least four other films.  Popular culture often likens traveling 
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underwater in a submarine to the experience of “sailing” through deep space.  Even 
weapons aboard the Starship Enterprise bear the names of their submerged counterparts – 
torpedoes.  These are all examples of current cultural outlets for submarine discourse.  
While cultural discourse about, as well as that permeated by submarines continues, the 
on-the-ground reactions to that discourse will only become visible in the decades to 
come.  When that happens, the newly dominant cultural identity will become part of the 
larger historical trend that gave birth to preceding perceptions of submarines, and the 
process will continue indefinitely. 
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